

On reason and scripture in the Pratyabhijñā*

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Introduction – the paradoxical supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge in a system that claims to be a rational path towards liberation

It has often been noticed that the Kashmiri Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) and his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025) have introduced significant novelties in the nondualistic Śaivism to which they adhered by putting aside scriptural authority and engaging in a systematic rational dialogue with other Indian philosophical schools, both Buddhist and Brahmanical.¹ The Pratyabhijñā treatise,²

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¹ See Frauwallner 1962: 22, Sanderson 1985: 203, Sanderson 1988: 694, Torella 2002: xiii; see also e.g. Bronkhorst 1996: 603–604, Watson 2006: 88–89, and Ratié 2011a: 6–14.

² I.e., Utpaladeva's ĪPK, on which Utpaladeva himself has written two commentaries: a short *Vṛtti* and a more detailed *Vivṛti* (unfortunately, only a few fragments of the latter are known to date; see Torella 1988, 2007a, b, c and d, Kawajiri forthcoming and Ratié forthcoming b and

which aims at showing that reality is nothing but Śiva conceived as a single, omniscient and omnipotent consciousness, primarily consists in a phenomenological analysis of conscious events and in polemical discussions with various Indian schools of thought regarding the way these events should be interpreted. As Raffaele Torella has emphasized, in this treatise Utpaladeva only has recourse to the Śaiva scriptures (*āgama*)³ a posteriori, as a mere confirmation of that which has already been demonstrated through the independent means of experience (*anubhava*) and reason (*yukti*).⁴

c). Abhinavagupta has written two commentaries on Utpaladeva's Pratyabhijñā works: the ĪPV and the much more detailed ĪPVV. Unless otherwise stated, the texts mentioned are that of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies edition; the variants encountered in the *Bhāskari* edition and in the consulted manuscripts of the ĪPV and ĪPVV are mentioned only when an emendation is proposed.

³ In fact, as noted in Eltschinger 2007: 18–19, the translation of *āgama* as scripture is inadequate insofar as “le mot sanskrit *āgama* ne comporte aucune connotation liée à l'écrit (sanskrit *likh-*)” and mostly designates a category of texts that have *come down* (*āgata*) to us through tradition (see also Oberhammer 1974a: 17–18). However, the term is very often used to denote a text that is authoritative by principle from the point of view of a given religious tradition (even though as will be seen below, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta for instance present this meaning of the word as only secondary), and in this sense it can be considered more or less equivalent to the word “scripture.”

⁴ See Torella 2002: xxx, and Torella 2008: 517. It is worth noting that according to Abhinavagupta, even in the *Āgama* section of the treatise (which only comes after two much longer sections where Utpaladeva uses “the sole force of argumentation,” Torella 2002: xxx), Utpaladeva deals with matters that are not only taught in Śaiva scriptures but also supported by reason. See e.g. the introductions to the first chapter of this section: ĪPV II 187–188: ... *taṃ parameśvarāgamasiddhaṃ yuktyāpy anugataṃ pratyekatas⁽¹⁾ tattvagrāmaṃ darśayatīty āhnikatātparyam*. [⁽¹⁾ *pratyekatas*], L, S2, SOAS, *Bhāskari* : *pratīkatas* KSTS, S1; p.n.p. P] “Here is the gist of the chapter: [Utpaladeva] expounds [here] one by one all the ontological categories (*tattva*) that are established by the scriptures (*āgama*) of the Highest Lord [and] confirmed by reason (*yukti*) as well.” ĪPVV III 256: ... *śivādidharanyantānāṃ tattvānāṃ pārameśvarāgamasiddhaṃ yuktyāpy anugrhyamāṇaṃ pratyekataḥ svarūpaṃ*

Utpaladeva himself describes this innovative strategy within non-dualistic Śaivism as a “new path”⁵ towards liberation, and its inferential nature is repeatedly asserted by Abhinavagupta.⁶ It obviously stems from a “decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts [...] and to offer itself implicitly as an alternative to the dominant Śaiva Siddhānta.”⁷ At first sight though, this strategy seems somehow at odds with the hierarchy of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) presented by these philosophers: according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta – who rely, here as elsewhere, on Bhartṛhari’s views⁸ – scripture (*āgama*) as a means of knowledge is “as it were the life of perception and [inference];”⁹ experience and reason are only secondary and less powerful means of knowledge the validity of which ultimately rests on *āgama*. How then can Utpaladeva consider that the inferential discourse of his treatise is a proper and independent means of liberation? How does he conciliate the claim of an autonomous rational inquiry with the statement that scripture is the very life of all means of knowledge? The present article aims at answering these questions while examining Utpaladeva’s definition of the epistemic validity of scriptures as well as his conception of the treatise as a means of liberation.

darśayati. “[In this chapter, Utpaladeva] expounds one by one the nature – which is established through the scriptures of the Highest Lord and also supported by reason – of [each] ontological category, beginning with Śiva and ending with Earth.”

⁵ *navo mārگاḥ*, ĪPK 4.16; cf. *Vṛtti* 80: *abhinavo mārگاḥ*.

⁶ See Ratié 2009: 352, fn. 9, and below, fn. 111 and 112.

⁷ Torella 2002: xiii.

⁸ As regards Bhartṛhari’s crucial influence on Utpaladeva’s thought (and the discrepancy in this regard between Somānanda’s ŚD and Utpaladeva’s ĪPK and commentaries), see Torella 2008; on the importance of the grammarian-philosopher with respect to Utpaladeva’s definition of *āgama* in particular, see R. Torella’s contribution to the present volume.

⁹ *pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpāḥ* (ĪPV II 80).

Two meanings of the word *āgama*: realization (*vimarśa*) and the group of words (*śabdarāśi*) that expresses it

Most Brahmanical currents ascribe to *āgama*, understood as a text endowed with scriptural authority, an independent status as a (valid) means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).¹⁰ While many among these currents consider that its validity as a means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) rests on the fact that it was stated by a trustworthy or authoritative person (*āpta*),¹¹ the Mīmāṃsakas contend that scriptural authority is guaranteed by the fact that scripture, far from being created by human beings (*pauruṣeya*), reveals itself naturally,¹² and in this respect at least Bhartṛhari seems to hold a rather similar position insofar as he emphasizes that revelation (*śruti*) is said to be authorless (*akartṛka*).¹³ Many Buddhists adopt a much more critical attitude towards scriptural authority: Dharmakīrti for instance subjects scripture to the examination of reason, considering that it can be said to be valid only provided that its reliability (*avisamvāditva*) has been shown through rational arguments.¹⁴

In the Pratyabhijñā corpus, the question of the epistemic validity of scripture only appears in Abhinavagupta's commentaries on the two verses of the treatise that define the means of knowledge in general,¹⁵ but from Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV it is obvious that Utpala-

¹⁰ On the exception of the Vaiśeṣika, which does not acknowledge verbal testimony as a means of knowledge distinct from inference, see e.g. Chemparathy 1983: 8 and 20, Lyssenko 1998: 111 and Eltschinger 2007: 69–70.

¹¹ On this notion, see e.g. Oberhammer 1974b, Chemparathy 1983, van Bijlert 1989: 17, Lyssenko 1998: 111 and Eltschinger 2007: 76, n. 28.

¹² See e.g. D'Sa 1980, Chemparathy 1983: 15–17 and Eltschinger 2007: 115 ff.

¹³ See Akhujkar 1991: 11, n. 5 and Eltschinger 2007: 115–116, fn. 1 (quoting VP 1.136 and VPV 203, according to which the Veda's sentences are *apauruṣeya*).

¹⁴ See e.g. Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 313–314 and Eltschinger 2007.

¹⁵ ĪPK 2.3.1–2: *idam etādṛg ity evaṃ yadvaśād vyavatiṣṭhate / vastu pra-*

deva's almost entirely lost *Vivṛti* contained a detailed discussion on this topic.

According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, *āgama* is first and foremost a kind of realization (*vimarśa*). This key word in the Pratyabhijñā system designates the act through which consciousness, instead of passively reflecting its objects as a mirror, actively grasps itself *as being the consciousness of this or that*. This dynamic feature of consciousness is conceived as essentially verbal, since the Pratyabhijñā philosophers consider that any cognitive apprehension is of a linguistic nature (although in the case of immediate perception for instance it expresses itself in a sort of silent proto-language): being conscious of oneself, or being conscious of (being conscious of) an object, amounts to expressing oneself as being so and so, even in situations where consciousness seems devoid of any linguistic aspect.¹⁶

Far from being contingent, this ability of consciousness to grasp itself as being this or that constitutes its very essence and is fundamental to the system in its epistemological as well as metaphysical and cosmological aspects, since the Śaiva nondualists hold that

māṇaṃ tat so'pi svābhāso'bhinavodayaḥ // so'ntastathāvimarśātmā deśakālādyabhedini / ekābhidhānaviṣaye mitir vastuny abādhitā // "The means of knowledge is that thanks to which a thing is determined as existing thus: 'this, which is such;' it is the self-manifestation (*svābhāsa*) that arises [while being] new. This [manifestation,] which consists in such an internal realization (*vimarśa*), is the knowledge [resulting from the cognitive act] (*miti*) [provided it is] not contradicted; [this knowledge] regards a thing that is not differentiated by a [particular] place, time or [form and] is denoted by a single word."

¹⁶ On *vimarśa* and other related words see e.g. Frauwallner 1962: 22, Padoux 1963: 145–151 (where their relationship with *parā vāk*, "the supreme speech," is examined), Alper 1987, Torella 2002: xxiv–xxv (mentioning Bhartṛhari's influence on Utpaladeva's understanding of *vimarśa* while noting in fn. 34 that this notion "may also be considered as a development in philosophical terms of the experience of the 'effervescence of all Powers' (*sarvaśaktivilatā*)" derived by Somānanda from Śaiva scriptures), Ratié 2007: 337, fn. 51 and 339–340, and Ratié 2011a: 158–167 and 495–543.

there is nothing outside of Śiva understood as an all-encompassing consciousness, and that this unique consciousness creates the universe merely by grasping (*vimṛś-*) itself in the form of the universe.

In his commentaries, not only does Abhinavagupta present *āgama* as such a kind of grasp or realization: he explains that *āgama* is a particularly intense kind of *vimarśa* of which scriptures are only a secondary expression. Thus according to him, the word *āgama* has two different but related (and hierarchized) meanings: in a literal or primary (*mukhya*) sense, *āgama* denotes a particularly intense intuition, whereas in a figurative or secondary sense, it designates what we could translate as scripture, i.e., a speech or a text considered as authoritative by a certain religious tradition – and it is *āgama* understood in the first sense that gives it meaning and validity to *āgama* in the second sense:

As for what is called *āgama*, it is the essential activity of the Lord whose nature is consciousness – [an activity] which is internal, which consists in speech, the essence of which is an extremely intense realization (*draḍhīyastamavimarśa*), and which is as it were the life of perception and [inference]. That which is realized through this [*āgama*] as being such is exactly such, as in ‘this poison cannot kill me [for] I am Garuḍa himself.’¹⁷ However, a group of words (*śabdarāśī*) which is in accordance with such a realization having speech as its essence is also a means of knowledge – for instance, the Veda, the [scriptures of the Śaiva]siddhānta, etc., or even other [texts] such as the scriptures of the Buddhists or [those of] the Jains, etc.¹⁸

¹⁷ Such formulas are presented in the Nyāya as analogous to *āgama*, their efficacy being invoked to demonstrate by analogy the authority of the Vedas, and they are more or less equated with *āgama* insofar as their validity is due to the fact that they are uttered by omniscient *āpta*-s (see e.g. Chemparathy 1983: 40–52). On the identification of *mantra*-s with the Veda in Bhartṛhari, see Aklujkar 1991: 1 and 12, n. 8 and Aklujkar 2009: 21 and 36–37. On the example given here of *mantra*-s meant to neutralize snake poison and on the notion of *gāruḍamantra*, see Eltschinger 2001: 16, 45, fn. 174 and 47–49.

¹⁸ ĪPV II 80–81: *āgamas tu nāmāntaraḥ śabdanarūpo draḍhīyastamavimarśātmā citśvabhāvasyeśvarasyāntaraṅga eva vyāpāraḥ pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpah; tena yad yathāmṛṣṭam*⁽¹⁾ *tat tathaiva, yathā naitad viṣaṃ*

Similarly, in the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta explains:

[*Āgama*] consists in speech – [i.e., it] is a realization (*vimarśana*) that is the internal, essential form of that which consists in consciousness[, and it] is as it were the life of perception and [inference]; that which is realized through this [*āgama*] as being such is exactly such – in this regard [nobody] disagrees –, as in “I, who am Garuḍa himself, play with snakes [and] transform poison into nectar.” And accordingly, they say that ‘he who can [mentally] make himself such in this regard is indeed such,’ and ‘he [who] knows himself [as being] such, the gods know him as such.’ Therefore [we] call *āgama* in a literal sense (*mukhyatayā*) this very realization; but in a figurative sense (*upacāreṇa*), [we] also [call *āgama*] a group of words that produces this [realization], because of its causal role (*upayogitva*) with respect to this [realization].¹⁹

The distinction is reminiscent of Bhartṛhari’s twofold use of the word “Veda.”²⁰ Equally worth noting is the fact that Abhinavagupta identifies *āgama* in the first, “literal” sense of the term with *prasiddhi*.²¹ The latter term often designates a common, consensual or pub-

mām mārayati garuḍa evāham iti. tatra tu tathāvidhe śabdanātmani vimarśe’nukūlyam yo bhajate śabdarāśiḥ so’pi pramāṇam yathā vedasiddhāntādir anyo’pi vā bauddhārhatāgamādiḥ. [(1)yad yathāmṛṣṭam J, P, B, SOAS, Bhāskari : yad yad amṛṣṭam KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS].

¹⁹ ĪPVV III 84: *śabdanarūpatvaṃ vimarśanam yad āntaram citśvabhāvasyāntaraṅgam rūpaṃ pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaṃ tena yad yathā⁽¹⁾ vimṛṣṭam tat tathāiva bhavatīti nātra vivādo yathā garuḍa evāham kṛdāmi pannagair viṣam amṛtikaromīti. tathā cāhur ātmānam yādṛśam yo’tra bhāvayet tādrśo hy asāv ity ātmānam yādṛśam veda devā enam tathā vidur iti ca. tataḥ sa eva vimarśa āgama ity ucyate mukhyatayā, tadupayogitayā tūpacāreṇa tajjanako’pi śabdarāśiḥ. [(1)yad yathā conj. : yad KSTS, BL.]*

²⁰ On the two meanings of Veda (as a subtle unitary form or as the texts that express it) in the VP, see e.g. Aklujkar 1991: 5 and 14, n. 33, and Aklujkar 2009: 54–55 (and note the use of the word *rāśi* with respect to the collection of Vedic texts as opposed to the unitary subtle form of the Veda).

²¹ See e.g. TĀ 35.2ab: *prasiddhim anusandhāya saiva cāgama ucyate* / “One talks about *āgama* when having *prasiddhi* in mind.” Cf. TĀV XII 356: *saiva ca prasiddhir āgama ucyate*. “And it is this *prasiddhi* that [we] call *āgama*.”

lic knowledge or usage (*prasiddha* can mean “well known,” “known of all”), and in some of the Pratyabhijñā texts where it appears, it could be understood as a knowledge inherited by hearsay from tradition. However, it also bears there other shades of meaning that prevent from simply equating it with a kind of traditional knowledge, so that finding an equivalent in European languages proves to be a particularly arduous task. *Prasiddhi* has to do with an intuitive knowledge and is related to *pratibhā*, “intuition.”²² Nonetheless this intuition, while being prediscursive in the sense that it appears before any kind of reasoning, is also essentially related to language as it is a kind of realization (*vimarśa*) through which consciousness expresses its own awareness. It also has to do with some sort of belief insofar as it rests neither on perception nor on inference.²³ However, it is not the result of the previous examination and acceptance of a statement that the knowing subject would first scrutinize before acknowledging its truth or at least its plausibility; nor is it a kind of awareness in which a doubt might remain.²⁴ In the Pratyabhijñā texts, the word *prasiddhi* therefore denotes some kind of a priori certainty,²⁵ provided that here we understand a priori to mean that this knowledge is anterior *both* to perception and reasoning, since it extends to the intuitive understanding that experts have of objects

²² On the relation between *prasiddhi* and *pratibhā*, and on Bhartṛhari’s influence as regards the notion of *prasiddhi* in Pratyabhijñā texts, see R. Torella’s contribution to the present volume. See also, on the meaning(s) of *pratibhā* in Bhartṛhari’s works, Aklujkar 2010: 391.

²³ Thus Raniero Gnoli eventually chose to translate it as “credenza” in his translation of the TĀ (see Gnoli 1999: 628, n. 1).

²⁴ See, e.g., TĀ35.19cd–20: *prasiddhiścāvigānotthāpratītiḥśabdanātmikā // mātuḥ svabhāvo yat tasyām śaṅkate naiṣa jātucit / svakṛtatvavaśād eva sarvavit sa hi śaṅkaraḥ* // “And *prasiddhi*, which is a knowledge that arises without contradiction [and] has speech as its essence, is the [very] nature of the subject; with respect to it this [subject] never has any doubt, precisely because he himself has created [it]; for [this subject] is Śaṅkara [himself], who is omniscient.”

²⁵ Cf. R. Gnoli’s first translation as “certezza a priori” (see Gnoli 1999: 628, n. 1).

that belong to their field of expertise²⁶ as well as to what we would probably term the “instinct” of animals or children to behave in a particular way.²⁷

The Pratyabhijñā’s hierarchy of the means of knowledge: the superiority of *āgama* over perception and inference

From this point of view, at first sight the Pratyabhijñā’s position is very close to that of the Brahmanical thinkers who consider in their vast majority that *āgama* need not and should not be subjected to a rational examination. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers present *āgama* not only as an independent means of knowledge, but as a means of knowledge *superior* to all the others, and Abhinavagupta himself insists on his agreement in this respect with Bhartṛhari or the Naiyāyikas.²⁸

Thus Abhinavagupta argues that even immediate perception requires the a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) in which *āgama* primarily consists. In these passages he seems to rely implicitly on the Buddhist epistemologists’ definition of the means of knowledge insofar as he presupposes that a *pramāṇa* in general (and perception in particular) is that which enables to successfully reach an object endowed with a certain efficacy (*arthakriyā*).²⁹ But whereas Dharmakīrti con-

²⁶ See e.g. VP 1.35 and TSā 195–196, quoted below, fn. 48.

²⁷ See e.g. TĀ 35.3cd ff., quoted below (fn. 33, 35 and 38). Here again, Bhartṛhari’s influence is obvious; see e.g. Houben 1997: 326: “For Bhartṛhari intuition (including even instinct) and traditional knowledge are not contradictory, but rather the two sides of one coin, or the two extremes of a single continuum.”

²⁸ See below, fn. 63.

²⁹ Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta know Dharmakīrti’s famous definition of the means of knowledge in PV *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 1ab and 5c: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam... ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*. “The means of knowledge is a cognition that does not deceive (*avisaṃvādin*) [...] or the manifestation of an object that was not known [so far].” The second part of the definition (in fact borrowed from the Mīmāṃsakas, see Krasser 2001 and Kataoka 2003) is explicitly included in Utpala-

siders that perception occurs independently of *āgama*, according to

deva's own definition (see ĪPK 2.3.1, quoted above, fn. 15: the means of knowledge is a manifestation that "arises [while being] new"). As for the first part, Utpaladeva was explaining in his lost *Vivṛti* that it is also included in his own definition, although implicitly. See ĪPVV III 73–74: *nanv aṣaṃvāditvaṃ pramāṇasya yal lakṣaṇaṃ kim iha tyaktam eva tat? na tyaktaṃ laukikatvād⁽¹⁾ iti darśayaty vastv iti. vastu vyavatiṣṭhata iti hy anena tad evoktam.* [⁽¹⁾ *laukikatvād* conj. : *lokikatvād* KSTS]. "[An objector:] But why is the characteristic of the means of knowledge that is the property of not deceiving (*aṣaṃvāditva*) abandoned here[, in Utpaladeva's definition]? In [the sentence beginning with] 'The thing..., [Utpaladeva] shows that [in fact] it is not abandoned, because of its having a mundane [value]; for this very [characteristic] has been stated [by Utpaladeva when saying in his verse that the means of knowledge is that thanks to which] 'a thing is determined' (*vastu vyavatiṣṭhate*).'" The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus appropriate the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* but claim to give it its full meaning: according to Abhinavagupta, it would be empty if it were not inserted within Utpaladeva's more complete definition, because on its own it fails to express the essential property of the means of knowledge. See ĪPV II 84–85: *yas tv aṣaṃvādatvaṃ tasya lakṣaṇaṃ āha tenāpi prāpakatvaṃ pravartakatvaṃ pravṛttiyogyaśakyaprāptikavastūpadarśakatvaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ bruvatā na kiṃcīt pramāṇābhimatabodhaviśrāntaṃ svarūpamuktam, tacedanena lakṣaṇena nirvāhyate tan nirvyūḍhaṃ bhavaty anyathā, mukhabhaṅgamūrdhakampāṅgulimoṭanādimātratattvaṃ tad ity alaṃ vistareṇa.* "As for the [Buddhist opponent] who states that the characteristic of the [means of knowledge] is the fact that it does not deceive (*aṣaṃvādatva*), while saying that the characteristic of the means of knowledge is the fact that it enables to obtain [the object] (*prāpakatva*) [and] that it prompts towards the object (*pravartakatva*), [i.e.,] the fact that it shows an entity the obtainment of which is possible [and] which is fit for [being the object of] activity, he himself has defined no nature whatsoever that would rest on consciousness, [although it is consciousness] which is considered a means of knowledge. And if [a follower of Dharmakīrti answers] that this [definition by Dharmakīrti] enables to establish this [nature, we answer that] it is de facto established otherwise: this [argument] amounts to nothing but a grimace, a shaking of the head, a snap of the fingers and the like – so enough with this digression." The opponent targetted in this passage is probably Dharmottara (on Dharmottara's theory of knowledge and particularly on his use of the vocabulary employed here by Abhinavagupta, see Krasser 1995: 247–248). On the Buddhist epistemologists'

Abhinavagupta, this very definition of perception necessarily implies the *āgama*'s intervention. Thus in the *ĪPVV*, he notices:

To explain: even that which is directly perceived (*pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭa*) necessarily requires an a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) characterised as *āgama* [and] used by the learned with respect to the [various] efficacies (*arthakriyā*) [of perceived objects], [in the form] "this is a cow whose milk is wholesome and pure," and "this is a she-ass whose milk weakens the digestive faculty and is impure."³⁰

In his *TĀ*, Abhinavagupta was already emphasizing that perception requires an a priori certainty considered as identical with *āgama*:

Even perception – which arises thanks to particular [causes] such as a visual organ, a Self, a source of light, an object and so on – requires at [its] root an a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) consisting thus [in *āgama*]. This very [requirement] is made obvious through [a reasoning based on] co-absence (*vyatireka*):³¹ what would a child who was [just] born in a [place] surrounded from all sides [by various objects],³² who is alone [and] hungry, do [without the a priori certainty]? What would he take? How would he see? Why would he move?³³

principle that the means of knowledge prompts to act (*pravartaka*) and enables to obtain (*prāpaka*) the object, see e.g. *NBṬ* 19: *adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ*. "When the object is known [through the means of knowledge], the individual is prompted to act (*pravartita*) [towards this object] and the object is made to be obtained (*prāpita*).” On Utpaladeva's strategy of systematic annexation of Buddhist epistemology, see Torella 1992.

³⁰ *ĪPVV* III 83: *tathā hi pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭam apy arthakriyāsu śiṣṭair yojyamānām āgamalakṣaṇām prasiddhim apekṣata eva – iyaṃ sā gaur yasyāḥ kṣīraṃ pathyaṃ pavitraṃ ca, iyaṃ sā gardabhī yasyāḥ payo'gnisādanam apavitraṃ ceti*. On *agnisādana/agnisāda*, see Meulenbeld 1999: 440.

³¹ I.e., by showing that perception could not occur in the absence of *prasiddhi*.

³² Cf. *TĀV ad loc.* (*sarvato nānāvidhārthasārthasaṃvalite sthāne*), quoted below, fn. 34.

³³ *TĀ* 35.3cd–5ab: *pratyakṣamaṇetrātmadīpārthādiviśeṣajam // apekṣate tatra mūle prasiddhiṃ tām tathātmikām / etad eva vyatirekadvāreṇa vyanakty abhitaṣaṃvrte jāta ekākī kṣudhitaḥ śīśuḥ // kiṃ karotu kim ādattām kena paśyatu kiṃ vrajet /*

As Jayaratha explains,³⁴ a new-born child – who, by definition, has not received any teaching – is not capable of perceiving the objects that surround him because in order to perceive them as objects (and therefore, as possible means of fulfilling his needs), he must first grasp himself (as having particular needs, as being different from the objects surrounding him, etc.), but this grasp or realization (*avamarśa*) is not contained within the bare awareness of something's immediate presence in which perception consists. One could object that the knowledge thanks to which the child goes towards a particular object such as milk is in fact the mere product of repeated experiences that progressively endow the child with the knowledge of a co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*) through which he infers that milk for instance is good for him because whenever he drinks milk he feels good, whereas whenever he does not he wastes away.³⁵ However, according to Abhinavagupta, this thesis is not sound because the child does not desire just any object before realizing that one of them is more suitable than the others: his urge, far from being the result of a series of experiences driven by arbitrary intuitions, is determined from the beginning as an urge to drink milk (and not earth for instance), and the child's awareness that he

³⁴ TĀV XII 358: *tadaharjāto hi bālaḥ sarvato nānāvidhārthasārthasamṇvalite sthāne kṣudhitaḥ sākāṅkṣo'py ekāky aprāptaparopadeśaḥ kiṃ karotu vinā svāvamarśātmikāṃ prasiddhiṃ niyataviṣayahānādānavyavahāro bālasya na syād ity arthaḥ*. "For although a new-born child who is in a place surrounded from all sides by a multitude of objects of all kinds [and] who is hungry has needs, [since] being alone, he has not received somebody else's teaching, what would he do without the a priori certainty that consists in the realization of himself (*svāvamarśa*)? [Abhinavagupta] means that [such a] child cannot have the behaviour (*vyavahāra*) consisting in rejecting and taking according to [each] particular object."

³⁵ This objection is stated in TĀ 35.5cd–6: *nanu vastuśatākīrṇe sthāne'py asya yad eva hi // paśyato jighrato vāpi sprśataḥ samprasīdati / cetastad evādāya drāk so'nvayavyatirekabhāk //* "But even in [that] place full of innumerable things, the mind of this [child] who is seeing, smelling or touching experiences satisfaction; [and] having grasped precisely that [which he has seen, smelt or touched with pleasure], he quickly acquires [the knowledge of] co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*)."

is satisfied and that his satisfaction is caused by the particular entity that is milk has nothing to do with inference (since this awareness is of an immediate nature) or with perception (since perception is a means of knowing external objects and not internal states).

Indian philosophers often have recourse to the notion of impregnation (*vāsanā*) understood as a residual trace (*saṃskāra*) left by a former experience to explain some states of consciousness such as memory that are determined by past conscious events, and the child's awareness could be considered to be thus determined by a latent trace left by a knowledge acquired in a former life. In fact such an explanation is found in Bhartṛhari's VP (where it is used as an argument in favour of the linguistic nature of all perceptions)³⁶ but also in various works – whether Brahmanical or Buddhist – concerned with demonstrating transmigration.³⁷ Now, according to Abhinavagupta,

³⁶ See VP 1.113: *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / yāṃ pūrvā-hitasamkāro bālo'pi pratipadyate* // “In this world, any [awareness] that [something] has to be done in this [or that] way (*itikartavyatā*) is grounded in speech; even a child reaches this [awareness insofar as] residual traces were left [in him] in previous [lives].”

³⁷ Regarding Brahmanical sources see e.g. NSū 3.1.21, which adduces the following reason for considering that the self transmigrates: *pretyā-hārābhyāsakṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt* // “Because of the [child's] desire for breast-milk, which is produced by the repeated practice of taking food [in a previous life and occurs in the child] after he has departed [from his previous body].” (On the meaning of *pretya* here see NBh 148: *sa khalv ayam ātmā pūrvaśarīrāt pretya śarīrāntaram āpannaḥ*... “Indeed, this very self, having departed from [its] previous body [and] being endowed with another body...”). As for the argument on the Buddhist side, see e.g. TS 1939–1941: *api ca stanapānādāv abhilāṣo pravartate / udvega upaghāte ca sadyojanmabhṛtām api // ruditastanapānādikāryeṇāsau ca gamyate / sa ca sarvo vikalpātmā sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgavān // na nāmārūpam abhyastam asmin janmani vidyate / teṣāṃ cānyabhavābhāve tad-ucchedaḥ prasajyate* // “Moreover, even in new-born [children], a desire to drink milk for instance occurs, as well as a fear of injuries; and [we] know this from the [perceptible] effect [of this desire or fear, namely] the fact that [the child] cries, drinks milk, etc. Now, all these [desire and fear, etc., regarding particular objects] consist in conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*) and are associated with names; [but the child] cannot have acquired through practice (*abhyasta*) the nature of names [i.e.

admitting thus that the child's present state of consciousness stems from a knowledge that has come down (*āgata*) to him from the past and is neither perception nor inference amounts to acknowledging that his knowledge is of an āgamic nature: it is a kind of a priori certainty, which therefore has to be admitted to be "the fundamental means of knowledge as regards everything without exception;"³⁸ and this certainty itself is grounded in the self-awareness of the omniscient universal consciousness.³⁹

their power to express a particular meaning] in this [present] life. And if there were no other existences [besides the present one,] the absolute impossibility of these [desire, fear, etc.] would follow."

³⁸ TĀ 35.7–10cd: *hanta cetaḥprasādo'pi yo'sāv arthaviśeṣagaḥ / so'pi prāgvāsanārūpavimarśaparikalpitaḥ // na pratyakṣānumānādibāhyamānaprasādajaḥ / prāgvāsanopajīvy etat pratibhāmātram eva na // na mṛdabhya vahārecchā puṃso bālasya jāyate / prāgvāsanopajīvī ced vimarśaḥ sā ca vāsanā // prācyā ced āgatā seyaṃ prasiddhiḥ paurvakālikī / na ca cetaḥprasattyaiva sarvo vyavahṛtikramaḥ // mūlaṃ prasiddhis tan mānaṃ sarvatraiveti grhyatām /* "But see: even this satisfaction in the mind [of the child] with respect to a particular object is built through a realization (*vimarśa*) consisting in a former impregnation (*vāsanā*); it does not stem from the satisfaction of an external means of knowledge such as perception or inference! It is definitely not a mere intuition [devoid of any cause, but] depends on a former impregnation: the desire to eat earth does not arise in a man's offspring! And if [the opponent answers] that this realization depends on a former impregnation and if [he concedes] that this impregnation belongs to the past, this [impregnation] is precisely the a priori certainty that belongs to the past and has come down (*āgata*) [to him]. And [therefore] the whole succession of mundane activities (*vyavahṛti*) does not come from the mere satisfaction of the mind [when encountering this or that object]: one must acknowledge that the a priori certainty is the fundamental (*mūla*) means of knowledge as regards everything without exception."

³⁹ See TĀ 35.14: *bhogāpavargataddhetuprasiddhiśataśobhitaḥ / tadvimarśasvabhāvo'sau bhairavaḥ parameśvaraḥ //* "It is Bhairava, the Highest Lord, who consists in this realization (*vimarśa*) [and] is adorned with [all the] innumerable experiences, liberations, their causes and the a priori certainties." In TĀV XII 363, Jayaratha introduces the verse thus: *ataś caika eva pūrṇāhaṃparāmarśamayaḥ sarvajñaḥ parameśvaraḥ samastaprasiddhinibandhanabhūta ity āha.* "And as a consequence, [Abhinavagupta now] states that the ground (*nibandhana*) for all a pri-

Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that inference rests on the means of knowledge that is *āgama* thus understood as *prasiddhi*. Several justifications of this statement are found in the ĪPV, ĪPVV, TĀ and TSā.

According to these texts, it is the case first because inference is necessarily based on perception⁴⁰ (and from this point of view, inference is weaker than perception and *āgama*, since it is “further” from its object than the latter two, which reveal their objects in an immediate way and without having to depend on some other means of knowledge),⁴¹ and it is therefore limited to the perceptible world

ori certainties is the Highest Lord, who is absolutely one, consists in a full realization (*parāmarśa*) [of himself as] ‘I’ [and] is omniscient.”

⁴⁰ Thus, while shortly describing perception and inference as he explains Utpaladeva’s definition of the means of knowledge, Abhinavagupta states (ĪPV II 78–79): *tac caindriyake bodhe sukhādisaṃvedane yogijñāne cāvivādam eva, mukhyatayaiva prameyarūpa ābhāse sākṣād viśrānteḥ. anumānajā tu pratītir ābhāsāntarāt kāryarūpāt svabhāvabhūtād vābhāsāntare pratipattiḥ*. “And there is no dispute whatsoever as regards perceptual (*aindriyaka*) cognition, the awareness of pleasure, etc. and yogic cognition, because, since they are primary (*mukhya*), they rest directly (*sākṣāt*) on a manifestation (*ābhāsa*) having the form of an object of cognition. As for the knowledge produced by inference, it is the understanding of a [given] manifestation through another manifestation which is either an effect [of the inferred manifestation] or a nature [shared by the inferred manifestation].”

⁴¹ See ĪPVV III 103–104: *pratyakṣāgamayor hi yat prakāśyaṃ ca vimṛśyaṃ ca, tad yathākramaṃ prakāśavimarśamukhenānyāpekṣāśūnyam. pratyakṣe hi prakāśadvāreṇa vimarśo’nyatra tu viparyayaḥ. anumāne tu nāntarīyakavastvantaraprakāśavimarśāpekṣānumeye prakāśavimarśayoga iti sāpekṣatvād dūreyaṃ pramitiḥ prameyāt*. “For that which is to be shown and realized in perception and *āgama* does not require (*apekṣā*) anything else, thanks respectively to the conscious manifestation (*prakāśa*) [in which perception consists] and to the realization (*vimarśa*) [in which *āgama* consists] – for in perception, the realization [occurs] through the conscious manifestation, and in any other case there is a [perceptual] error – whereas in an inference, the object of which requires the conscious manifestation and realization of something else that is invariably concomitant (*nāntarīyaka*) [with something that constitutes the cause of this other entity or has a common nature with

insofar as it rests on necessary relations (of identity or causality) between entities previously experienced as invariably concomitant,⁴² whereas the domain of *āgama* extends to both the perceptible and the imperceptible.⁴³

it,] since, [as Utpaladeva puts it,] '[it] is associated with the conscious manifestation and realization [of something else], [i.e.] since [inference] depends [on something else], the knowledge in which [it] results (*pramiti*) is further from the object of knowledge (*durā... prameyāt*)."

⁴² See e.g. ĪPK 1.5.8a: *anumānam anābhātapūrve naiveṣṭam...* / "Inference is *not* admitted as regards that which has never been manifested previously." (For an examination of this verse and its commentaries, see Ratié 2011b). Cf. e.g. ĪPVV III 82: *pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyam anīścitam cet tarhi pakṣadharmatvasapakṣasadbhāvavipakṣavyāvṛttiprāyaṃ svarūpaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva mūle niścetavyaṃ yasya liṅgasya, tad api na siddham apramāṇagrhitatattvasyāliṅgatvād iti liṅgato'rthadṛg iti yad anumānam tad api na kiñcid*. "If the validity of perception is not ascertained, then the inferential mark (*liṅga*) as well – the nature of which must be ascertained at [its] root through perception itself [and] which, according to the Buddhist logicians, amounts to [this threefold characteristic:] the fact that the property exists in the subject [of which it is to be predicated] (*pakṣadharmatva*), that it is present in similar instances (*sapakṣasadbhāva*) and that it is excluded from dissimilar instances (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*) – is not established either, because a reality that has not been grasped through a [valid] means of knowledge is not an inferential mark. Therefore inference, 'which is the cognition of an object through the [threefold] inferential mark,' is nothing either [if perception is not a valid means of knowledge]." Abhinavagupta is alluding here to PVin 2.1b (... *svārtham trirūpāl liṅgato'rthadṛk* / "[Among the two sorts of inference, inference] for oneself is the cognition of an object through the threefold inferential mark.").

⁴³ See e.g. ĪPVV III 85: *nyāya ity anumānam. īśvarasadbhāve hi saṃniveśakāryādiliṅgajam anumānam asty eva, tattvabhuvanādīnāṃ tv iyat-tāyāṃ nāsty anumānam ity āgama eva tatra śaraṇam*. "[Utpaladeva says] 'reasoning' (*nyāya*), i.e., inference. For as regards the existence of the Lord, there is indeed an inference that comes from an inferential mark such as the effect [consisting in] the [particular] arrangement (*saṃniveśa*) [that is the universe]; but there is no inference as regards the fact that the ontological categories (*tattva*), the [various] worlds, etc. are as [they are] – therefore in that regard, [we can] only take refuge in scripture (*āgama*). The inference proving the exis-

Abhinavagupta also considers that the co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*) on which any inference is necessarily based (such as the awarenesses that “wherever there is fire there is smoke” and “wherever there is no smoke there is no fire,” through which we can infer a fire’s presence from that of smoke) is itself grounded in *prasiddhi*, just as perception.⁴⁴ Thus in the TĀ, he argues that the

tence of the Lord (*īśvara*) to which Abhinavagupta refers here is not the inference found in the first chapters of the Pratyabhijñā treatise but the classical Naiyāyika inference of *īśvara*’s existence (on this proof and the way it was criticized by the Buddhists see Krasser 2002); it appears in Utpaladeva’s *ĪS* (see Taber 1986), a short treatise in which the Śaiva philosopher endeavours to prove the existence of *īśvara* merely from a Naiyāyika (and Saiddhāntika) point of view (see Torella 2002: xxi–xxii, Krasser 2002: 149–158, and Ratié forthcoming). On the idea that contrary to other means of knowledge, *āgama* is not limited in scope, see also Abhinavagupta’s introductions to the *Āgamādhikāra*. In *ĪPV* II 213, he thus states: *na hi pratyakṣaṃ mātṛāpramātauḥ sarvatra kramate. anumānam apy evam, na hi yad yad asti tatra tatra liṅgavyāptyādigrahaṇasambhavaḥ. āgamas tv aparicchinnaprakāśātmak amāheśvaravimarśaparamārthaḥ kiṃ na paśyet?* “For the perception of the māyic subject does not apply to everything; and the same goes for inference, for it is not possible to grasp the inferential mark, the pervasion, etc., with respect to everything that exists. On the other hand, what could *āgama* – the ultimate reality of which is a realization of the Great Lord who consists in an uninterrupted conscious manifestation – fail to see?” Cf. *ĪPVV* III 255: *tatrāsmadādiḥ pratyakṣaṃ nāśeṣasākṣātkāry anumānam apy evaṃ sarvasya liṅgavyāptyupalabdhisambhavābhāvāt. asaṅkucitaprakāśātmakaparamaśvaravimarśātmakaḥ punar āgamo viśvaṃ pramātuṃ samarthaḥ*. “In that regard, the perception of [limited subjects] such as we [are] does not give immediate access to everything; and inference too is such, since it is not possible to perceive the inferential mark and pervasion for everything. However, *āgama*, which consists in a realization of the Highest Lord who has as its essence a conscious manifestation that is not contracted, is capable of knowing everything.”

⁴⁴ See e.g. TSā 195: *prasiddhis tāvad avaśyopagamyānvayavyatirekādhya-akṣādīnāṃ tatprāmāṇyasya tanmūlatvāt*. “To begin with, one must necessarily acknowledge that co-presence and co-absence, perception, etc., involve an a priori certainty, because this [a priori certainty] is the root (*mūla*) of their validity.”

understanding of such a concomitance cannot spring from the bare perception of particulars: in order to grasp the concomitance of fire and smoke, one must first realize that the various singular entities successively perceived are all instances of “fire” and “smoke,” but in order to do so we need more than perception, which is the mere awareness of the manifestation of a singular entity. The gap between the perception of singulars and the conceptualization of generalities can only be bridged by some third kind of knowledge – i.e., again, *prasiddhi*.⁴⁵ At this point a Dharmakīrtian Buddhist could certainly reply that no such third means of knowledge is required, since a generality (*sāmānya*) such as “fire” can be considered to be mentally built through the exclusion of whatever has an efficacy (*arthakriyā*) that is different from that of “fire”⁴⁶ – but again, according to Abhinavagupta, the very awareness of *arthakriyā* cannot be brought about by perception and requires an a priori certainty,⁴⁷ and in the TSā too, familiar situations in which we learn something without having recourse either to mere perception or to the understanding of co-presence and co-absence are invoked so as to show that *prasiddhi* precedes perception and inference and makes them possible.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ TĀ 35.2cd–3ab: *anvayavyatirekau hi prasiddher upajīvakau // svāyattatve tayor vyaktipūge kiṃ syāt tayor gatiḥ* / “For co-presence and co-absence depend on a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*): if they were independent (*svāyatta*), within the mass of particulars, how could their understanding occur?”

⁴⁶ On the role of *arthakriyā* in Dharmakīrti’s theory of exclusion (*apoha*), see e.g. Katsura 1991.

⁴⁷ See ĪPVV III 82, quoted above, fn. 30.

⁴⁸ See TSā 195–196: *satyaṃ rajataṃ paśyāmīti hi sauvarṇikādīparaprasiddhyaiva, prasiddhir evāgamaḥ sā kācid dṛṣṭaphalā bubhukṣito bhūṅkta iti bālasya prasiddhita eva. tatra⁽¹⁾ pravṛttir nānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tadā tayor abhāvāt, yauvanāvasthāyāṃ tadbhāvo’py akiṃcitkaraḥ, prasiddhiṃ tu mūlīkṛtya so’stu kasmaicit kāryāyeti⁽²⁾*. [⁽¹⁾ *tatra* conj. : *tatra tatra* KSTS. ⁽²⁾ *kāryāyeti* conj. : *kāryāya* KSTS.] “For in [the realization] ‘I see some genuine silver,’ [which arises] through the mere a priori certainty of [someone] else who is a goldsmith for instance, it is the a priori certainty that is *āgama*. A certain such [a priori certainty] has visible results [– whereas other kinds of *prasiddhi* only have invisible

The ĪPVV similarly emphasizes that reasoning (*tarka*, *nyāya*) is incapable of attaining truth by itself since it depends on other means of knowledge without which it remains groundless: the belief that it constitutes an independent path towards truth or that it has a foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*) of its own is described as a mere intellectual arrogance by Abhinavagupta, according to whom reason, just as the necessary relations that it claims to reveal, is created by the Lord's free will (also termed his "power of necessity," *niyatiśakti*),⁴⁹ so that ultimately, reason's only ground is the aesthetic delight through which Śiva creates an infinitely varied universe:

results –, for instance] in the [realization] 'he who is hungry eats' of a [new-born] child[, which arises] through a mere a priori certainty. In that case, the [subject's] activity does not occur thanks to co-presence and co-absence, since [the awareness of] this [co-presence and co-absence] does not exist at the time [of childhood, and] even the existence of this [awareness] in the state of adulthood would have to come from nowhere [if co-presence and co-absence were not known through an a priori certainty]. Rather, [the subject knows] that this [particular object] must lead to a particular effect while relying on an a priori certainty." The goldsmith's example is obviously an echo of VP 1.35, where Bhartṛhari also insists that such an expert's knowledge is not of an inferential nature: *pareṣām aśamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate / maṇirūpyādivijñānam tadvidām nānumānikam* //. "The experts' knowledge of gems, silver, etc., which cannot be fully explained to others, arises from mere practice (*abhyāsa*); it is not inferential."

⁴⁹ Thus, immediately after giving the generic definition of inference (see above, fn. 40), Abhinavagupta adds (ĪPV II 79–80): *vastvantarasya ca tena sākaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvanīyamaḥ sāmānādhikarāṇīyamaś ceśvarānīyatiśaktyupajīvana evāvadhāryo bhavati nānyathā. tena yāvati niyatir jñātā tāvati deśe kāle vānumānam pramāṇam*. "And the necessity (*niyama*) for another thing of having a relation of cause and effect with the [perceived entity], as well as the necessity [for another thing] of having a common substrate (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) [with the perceived entity], can be determined only insofar as it depends on the power of necessity (*niyatiśakti*) of the Lord, and not otherwise. Therefore inference is a [valid] means of knowledge only in a place or time where this necessity is known." On *niyatiśakti*, see below, fn. 52. On the relation of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* in Śaiva nondualism and its connection with *svabhāvahetu* inferences, see e.g. Torella 2002: 179–180, fn. 17.

Reasoning (*tarka*) is absolutely devoid of foundation (*apratīṣṭha*) [by itself]; for it is created by the Highest Lord exactly in the same way [as the rest of the universe]. For this very reason, in this [world, although a given individual subject enjoys] a cycle of existences [pervaded by] reasoning (*tarkasaṃsāra*) through the progressive growth of [his] power, [i.e.] through extending the internally contracted power of [his] realization – which is equally useful with respect to mundane experience and liberation –, this [existence pervaded by reasonings] is necessarily inferior (*apara*) [insofar as it is] created by the Highest Lord, just as a cycle of existences [pervaded by] poetry (*kāvyaśamsāra*); for these cycles of existence are varied.⁵⁰ But although [according to us], reasoning is [in itself] devoid of foundation, this is in no way harmful for our system; for in [our] doctrine [according to which] reality is [what is] manifest, the necessity [through which] phenomena [are determined to appear in this or that particular way] is due to the Highest Lord's will, and this [will] conforms to a principle that only amounts to this much: [it is constantly] engaged in making phenomena arise in various ways; [it is constantly] engaged in making the knowing subjects varied through the variety [due to] the synthesis and separation of these [phenomena perceived and conceptualized by the different subjects; and it] cannot be put into question. Therefore reasoning shines [in the universe] without having any firm ground; whereas he who sees a foundation in this [reasoning] because of his intellect's arrogance (*svabuddhigarva*), just as [someone who] imagines that the [only] firm ground on the entire globe of the Earth is in the courtyard of his house, is either deluded, or strikingly resembling an idiot – so enough with this: inference cannot be trusted at all; rather, only *āgama* [can].⁵¹

⁵⁰ I.e., as far as I understand: reasonings are useful insofar as they increase the individual subject's power of realization, but they are ultimately groundless, since they are "created" by the absolute consciousness – i.e., they are only various limited aspects of reality that consciousness playfully takes on while manifesting an infinite variety of objects and subjects. Reasonings thus contribute to the differentiation of the individual subjects as they differ from one individual to another (and are therefore bound to contradict each other). Nonetheless, as Abhinavagupta immediately adds in the following sentences, this variety in reasonings is not to be criticized since just as any phenomenal variety, it is a manifestation of consciousness' unlimited creative power.

⁵¹ ĪPVV III 95–96: *sarvathā tarko'pratiṣṭha eva. tathaiva hi parameśva-*

Inference is grounded on a necessity that entirely depends on the universal consciousness' will: the only reason why there can be no smoke without fire is that at every single moment, this all-encompassing consciousness creates the universe as being determined by innumerable necessary relations which include that of fire and smoke.⁵² But because it freely chooses to subject the created world to

reṇa sa sṛṣṭaḥ. tata eveha śaktisaṃvardhanakrameṇāntaḥsaṅkucitavimarśaśaktisamākarṣaṇena tathaiva bhogāpavargopayoginopayujyamānaḥ parameśvareṇa sṛṣṭas tarkasaṃsāraḥ kāvyasaṃsāravat aparā eva. vicitrā hy amī saṃsārāḥ. apratiṣṭhitatve'pi tu tarkasya nāsmaddarśanasya khaṇḍanā kācit. ābhāsamānavastuvāde hi parameśvarereccayāyam ābhāsaniyamaḥ, sā ca vaicitryeṇābhāsān utthāpayantī tatsaṃyojanaviyojanaivaicitryeṇa ca pramātṛṇ vicitrikurvāṇā aparyanuyojyā ity etāvad eva nyāyam avatiṣṭhate. tad ayam alabdhaḥgādha eva tarkaḥ śobhate. atra tu svabuddhigarveṇa pratiṣṭhām paśyan svagrhaprāṅgaṇamadhyakalpitanīḥśeṣabhūgolakamadhyadhruvakasthānavanmūḍho vā ḍimbaviḍambako vety āstām. sarvathānumāne nāśvasitavyam, api tv āgama eva.

⁵² See e.g. ĪPV II 102 (*ad* ĪPK 2.3.8), which explains that any necessary relation between two entities (including the conventional relation between a word and what it denotes) is an effect of consciousness' "power of necessity": *etad uktam bhavati: yat kimcit kṛtrimam itarad vā bhāvābhāsasyābhāsāntareṇa nāntarīyakatvam pratibhāti tatra niyatiśaktimātram eva paraṃ vijṛmbhate. tat tu niyatiśaktirūpaṃ pūrvāparavitatakālam indhanakāryatve dhūmakāraṇatva uṣṇasvabhāvatve cābhāsamāne, anaticirakālam tu vahnnyādiśabdavācyatvābhāsādāv iti viśeṣaḥ. tataś ca niyatiśaktyupajīvanena dhūmābhāso'py agnyābhāsavyabhicārī.* "This what [Utpaladeva] means [here]: in any invariable concomitance (*nāntarīyakatva*) – whether conventional (*kṛtrima*) or not – that is manifest between the phenomenon [constituted by a given] entity and another phenomenon, it is absolutely nothing but the power of necessity that unfolds. The [only] difference is that the form [that] the power of necessity [takes on] extends to the past and the future when it is the fact that [fire] is the effect of fuel, the fact that [it] is the cause of smoke, and the fact that [its] nature is to be hot that are manifest; whereas the [form that the power of necessity takes on] does not last indefinitely (*anaticirakāla*) in the case of the manifestation of the fact that [fire] can be expressed by the term 'fire,' etc. And as a consequence, the phenomenon of smoke too is invariably concomitant (*avyabhicārīn*) with the phenomenon of fire because it depends on the

this necessity, it can also transgress a rule that it has playfully edicted; and so can anybody who has realized his or her identity with the universal consciousness.⁵³ Thus according to the Śaivas, some *yogins* are capable of transgressing the invariable concomitance at the core of the relation of cause and effect by producing a variety of material objects (such as whole cities or armies) without any kind of material cause, out of their mere free will –⁵⁴ which means that for instance they are capable of creating smoke without fire. Utpaladeva

power of necessity.” As for why the conventional invariable concomitance “does not last indefinitely,” see *Bhāskarī* II 111: *anaticirakālaṃ bhavaty asya samayasya madhye kalpitatvenānāditvābhāvād anyathā puruṣakṛtatvāyogāt*. “[It] ‘does not last indefinitely,’ because it is not beginningless (*anādi*) since it is constructed (*kalpita*) through convention (*samaya*); otherwise it could not have been produced by men.”

⁵³ See e.g. *ĪPV* II 153: *cetana eva tu tathā tathā bhavati bhagavān bhūri-bhargo mahādevo niyatyanuvartanollāṅghanaghanatarasvātantrya ity atra pakṣe niyatyanuvartini laukike prasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve svātantryam, tadollāṅghanam ādriyamāṇasya tu yogiprāyaprasiddhe lokottara iti na kaścid virodhaḥ*. “But in our system, according to which it is what is conscious (*cetana*) – [whether it be called] ‘the Venerable,’ ‘He whose rays are innumerable’ [or] ‘the Great Lord’ – that exists in this or that form, possessing the absolute freedom (*ghanatarasvātantrya*) to conform (*anuvartana*) to necessity (*niyati*) or to transgress it (*ullāṅghana*), there is freedom as regards the well-known ordinary (*laukika*) relation of cause and effect that conforms to necessity, but [also,] for he who concentrates on the transgression of this [necessity], as regards a supramundane (*lokottara*) [relation of cause and effect] that is mostly well known of *yogin*-s – therefore there is no contradiction.”

⁵⁴ See *ĪPK* 2.4.10: *yoginām api mṛdbīje vinaivecchāvaśena tat / ghaṭādi jāyate tat tat sthiraśvārthakriyākaram //* “There is also a [production] through the free will (*icchā*) of *yogin*-s, without any [material cause such as] clay [for a pot] or a seed [for a sprout]: various [objects], such as a pot, etc., arise [thus] while having an efficacy (*arthakriyā*) of their own and while lasting (*sthira*).” See also *ĪPK* 1.5.7: *cidātmaiva hi devo’ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ / yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet //* “For just as a *yogin*, the Lord, who consists in nothing but consciousness, must manifest externally all the objects that are internal to him, by virtue of his [free] will, without any material cause (*nirupādāna*).” For an examination of Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on these verses see Ratié 2010b: 460–464 and Ratié 2011a: 403–442.

and Abhinavagupta are fully aware that accepting the possibility of such a creation endangers the very foundations of reasoning, since it reduces to naught the so-called invariable concomitance between a cause and its effect, and even between an object and its nature.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ See the objection stated in ĪPV II 153–155 (in the following argument Abhinavagupta’s imaginary interlocutor alludes to the fact that according to the Buddhist logicians, ultimately an inference based on a nature can be reduced to an inference based on an effect: see e.g. Iwata 1991; cf. below, fn. 56, for more Śaiva allusions to this theory): *nanu yadi prasiddhakāraṇallaṅghanenāpi tatkāraṇajanyakāryaviśeṣatulyavṛttāny eva kāryāṇi jāyante, bhagnās tarhy anumānakathāḥ. tathā hi katham anyad anyatra niyamavad bhaved ity āśaṅkya prāmāṇikataraṃmanyais tādātmyatadutpattī niyamanidānam upagate. na hi niḥsvabhāvaṃ vastu bhavati, nāpi bhinnasvabhāvaṃ svabhāvabhedenā bhedaḥ, paryāyaśas tatsvabhāvadvayabhāve⁽¹⁾ ca niḥsvabhāvatāprasaṅgāt. evaṃ nirhetuke bhinnahetuke ca kārye vācyam. ubhayatrāpi ca hetukṛtaiva vyavasthā. svahetuta eva hi śiṃśapā vṛkṣasvabhāvavyabhicāriṇi jātā, svahetutaś ca hutabhugdhūmajananasvabhāvaḥ, tad idānīm niyatyullaṅghini kāryakāraṇabhāve sarvam idaṃ vighaṭeta. yogicchayā hi śiṃśapāpy avṛkṣasvabhāvā bhavet, dhūme tu dviguṇaṃ codyam; agnyādisāmagrī yogicchodbhūtā dhūmaṃ na janayet, yogicchā vāgnikaṃ dhūmaṃ, iti na syād anumānam, asti ca tal loke. [⁽¹⁾tatsvabhāvadvayabhāve conj. Eltschinger : tatsvabhāvadvayābhāve KSTS, Bhāskari, J, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P] “But if some effects arise even through a transgression (*ullaṅghana*) of the [necessary relation with their] well-known cause, while behaving exactly as the particular effect born of this [well-known] cause, then the so-called inferences are reduced to naught! To explain: anticipating the objection ‘[since all things are self-confined,] how can a thing have a necessity that restricts it (*niyama*) with respect to something else?’, some [Buddhist logicians] who see themselves as great epistemologists (*prāmāṇikataraṃmanyas*) have acknowledged that identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*) are the cause of this restricting necessity. For a thing cannot be devoid of nature (*svabhāva*) nor have different natures, since the difference [between different things] is due to the difference in the nature [of these things], and since if a [thing] had two natures successively, as a consequence [it] would be devoid of any nature. And one must consider that the same goes for the effect (*kārya*), [which similarly can neither be] devoid of cause [nor have] different causes. And in both cases, [i.e., whether the object is considered from the point of view of its nature or as an effect,] it is only [the object’s] cause that leads to establishing [the object’s] existence (*vyavasthā*);*

Utpaladeva solves the problem constituted by this transgression (*atikrama*, *ullaṅghana*) of the necessity on which inference depends by specifying that a nature (*svabhāva*) or an effect (*kārya*) can be considered valid reasons for an inference only “provided that they have been established through another means of knowledge not to be the creation of a *yogin*.”⁵⁶ However, this other means of knowledge cannot be another inference (which would lead to a *regressio ad infi-*

for it is thanks to its own cause[, i.e. the seed,] that [the tree] called ‘*śiṃśapā*’ arises while invariably possessing the nature of a tree; and it is thanks to its own cause, [i.e. the fuel,] that the nature [consisting in] producing smoke belongs to fire. Therefore if, from now on, the relation of cause and effect transgresses (*ullaṅghin*) necessity (*niyati*), all of this must be reduced to naught! For by virtue of a *yogin*’s will, even a *śiṃśapā* may have a nature that may not be [that of] the tree; and as regards smoke, this raises even twice more problems: the [causal] complex [required in order to produce smoke] – such as fire, etc. – that has risen thanks to a *yogin*’s will may not produce smoke; or a *yogin*’s will [may produce] smoke without fire. Therefore inference cannot occur [if this transgression of necessity is accepted]; and yet [inference] exists in this world!”

⁵⁶ ĪPK 2.4.11: *yoginirmāṇatābhāve pramāṇāntarāniścite / kāryaṃ hetuḥ svabhāvo vāta evotpattimūlajaḥ* // “Precisely for this reason, an effect or a nature – which [both] arise from the root that is the production (*utpatti*) [by a particular cause] – are a [valid inferential] reason (*hetu*) provided that they have been established through another means of knowledge not to be the creation of a *yogin*.” Utpaladeva specifies that both an effect and a nature have production as their “root” because according to the Buddhist logicians, both the invariable concomitance between an object and its nature and that of an effect and its cause have as their origin the cause that produces the object. See above, fn. 55, and ĪPV II 157–158: *nanu svabhāvahetau kim anayā cintayā? āha: vṛkṣatvāvyabhicāriṇyāḥ śiṃśapāyā utpatter yan mūlaṃ kāraṇaṃ tata eva sa tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo jāyata iti*. “[Utpaladeva] answers the question ‘But what is the point of thus pondering over the [inferential] reason [constituted by] a nature (*svabhāvahetu*)?’ [by saying]: ‘It is due to the ‘root,’ [i.e.], due to the cause of the production of the *śiṃśapā*, which is invariably concomitant with with [the property of] being a tree, that the nature (*svabhāva*) [of the *śiṃśapā*] arises while conforming only to this [fact of being a tree] (*tanmātrānubandhin*).’ (On *tanmātrānubandhin*, see below, fn. 129).

nitum) nor the perception of the object in question, since the *yogin's* creation is supposedly similar in every respect (including that of its duration and efficacy) to an object produced by an ordinary cause.⁵⁷ It is therefore once again a variety of *prasiddhi* that guarantees that an inferential reason is valid.⁵⁸ And it is no coincidence if the topic of the *yogin's* creation is examined at length in the passages of the ĪPVV that deal with the definition of the three means of knowledge and endeavour to show the weakness of inference when it operates without the help of *āgama*:⁵⁹ reasons (*hetu*) or inferential marks (*liṅga*), whether defined by Buddhist or Brahmanical logicians, are impossible to determine⁶⁰ not only because some objects are by nature

⁵⁷ See ĪPK 2.4.10, quoted above, fn. 54, and below, fn. 58.

⁵⁸ See ĪPV II 155–156: *yogīcchāpi sarvathā tādrśam eva na tu vṛścika-gomayādisambhūtavṛścikādinyāyena kathaṃcid rasavīryādīnā bhinnam kāryaṃ janayatīti yat kathitam ata evāsmād eva hetoḥ kāryaṃ vā dhūmādy agnyanumāne, śiṃśapātvādisvabhāvo vā vṛkṣatvādyanumāna evaṃ hetur bhavati yadi pramāṇāntareṇa lokaprasiddhyā yoginirmāṇatvasyābhāvo niścito bhavati nānyathā. ata evānumāne janmāntarābhyāsalo-kaprasiddhyādikam avaśyopajīvyam.* “A *yogin's* will too produces an effect that is exactly similar [to the effect produced by an ordinary cause] in every respect, and not different [from the latter effect] from any point of view, contrary to the case of a scorpio produced [by spontaneous generation] in cow dung for instance, [which differs] from a scorpio [produced in the ordinary way] as regards its bodily fluid, sperm, etc. Precisely for the reason expounded [in the previous verse], an effect such as smoke is the reason of the inference of fire, or a nature (*svabhāva*) such as being a *śiṃśapā* is the reason of the inference of being a tree, if [they] have been established not to be [the result of] the creation of a *yogin* ‘through another means of knowledge,’ [i.e.] through general certainty (*lokaprasiddhi*); and [a nature or an effect] cannot [be an inferential reason] if it is not the case. This is the reason why as regards inference, one must necessarily rely on the practice [acquired in] former lives, general certainty and so on.”

⁵⁹ See e.g. the long passage in the ĪPVV III 86 ff., beginning with *yoginir-mitaṃ vedaṃ syāt, itarad vā laukikam ity api nāvadhārayituṃ śakyam*, “One cannot determine either whether this [perceived thing on which the inference is based] was created by a *yogin* (*yoginirmita*) or [if it is] ‘otherwise,’ [i.e.], if it is ordinary (*laukika*)...”

⁶⁰ See e.g. ĪPVV III 86: *nanu yuktir anumānaṃ yadi, tathāpi katham iyam*

imperceptible, but more importantly, because inference cannot determine by itself whether they are indeed inferential reasons or not.

This is why, just as Bhartṛhari, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that the means of knowledge do not operate separately but together:⁶¹ inference is valid provided that it is helped by per-

amukhyā? āha tac cety anumānam. kāryādīti kāryasvabhāvadvayarūpam, kāryam kāraṇam saṃyogi samavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam iti vā pañca-karūpam. idam asya kāryam asya svabhāvo'sya kāraṇam asya saṃyogy asya samavāyy asya virodhi niyamenety evambhūto yaḥ kāryādibhāvaḥ, sa durlakṣaḥ sann apy avadhārayitum aśakyo yasya, tathābhūtaṃ liṅgam. “[An objector having asked] ‘But if inference is reasoning (*yukti*), how [can you say that reasoning] is not fundamental [among means of knowledge]?’ [Utpaladeva] answers [in the sentence beginning with] ‘And this...’, [i.e.], ‘And inference...’. [Inference has as its reason] ‘the effect, etc.’, [i.e., according to the Buddhists,] it has the two forms [consisting respectively in the inference resting on a reason that is] an effect [and the inference resting on a reason that is] a nature; alternatively, [according to the Vaiśeṣikas,] it has five forms since [Kaṇāda says that] ‘[knowledge] has an inferential mark [that is] an effect [or] a cause [of what is inferred, or that] has a [relation of] contact, inherence or contradiction [with what is inferred].’ [But] the inferential mark is such that its nature as an effect, etc. – [expressed] in such [forms] as ‘this is necessarily the effect of that, the nature of that, the cause of that, that which is in contact with that, that which is inherent in that’ is ‘impossible to determine’ (*durlakṣa*) [according to Utpaladeva, i.e.], it cannot be determined, even though it exists.” While mentioning the Vaiśeṣika’s conception of inferential mark, Abhinavagupta quotes VSū 9.18 (*asyedaṃ kāryam kāraṇam sambandhy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam*) with a few variants (see Kellner 2010: 92 and fn. 14, on the probable “earliest form” of the *sūtra*). The whole passage of the ĪPVV is reminiscent of VPV 88–89 *ad* VP 1.32 (quoted below, fn. 66), according to which the *prasiddhi* of an unobserved object is difficult/impossible to determine (*duravasāna*) through an inferential cognition, because the awareness of the similarity between the inferential mark and the unperceived possessor of the mark ultimately depends on *āgama* (see Akamatsu 2010).

⁶¹ Thus, after explaining in ĪPVV III 83 (see above, fn. 30) that even direct perception requires *prasiddhi* as regards the object’s efficacy, Abhinavagupta adds: *tata eva pramāṇasamūhād eva pravṛttir iti vakṣyate sā tu deśādiketi. sa caikāntarmukhasvatantraparāmarśasamyojitaviyojitābhā-*

ception and *āgama*. But even though the means of knowledge are

sasvasaṃvedanarūpaparameśvarasvātantryavāda eva yujyata ity etad apy agre bhaviṣyati. ihāstāṃ tāvat. “This is why [Utpaladeva] will state that activity arises from the association of means of knowledge in [ĪPK 2.3.9 which begins with the words] ‘*sā tu deśādikā*’. And [he] will [make clear] later [in the treatise] that this [association] is possible only in [our] doctrine [according to which] the freedom of the Highest Lord consists in self-consciousness with respect to the phenomena that are synthesized and separated by a unique, introverted and free realization (*parāmarśa*) – but at this point [of the treatise], let us leave this matter aside for the time being.” According to ĪPK 2.3.9 (to which Abhinavagupta alludes here), “as for the activity that starts at the moment [when a particular entity is perceived] for the subject who aims at a particular object, [it occurs] with respect to the singular [object] differentiated by various distinct perceptions of place, etc., and also because of inference” (*sā tu deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne svalakṣaṇe / tātkālikī pravṛttiḥ syād arthino’py anumānataḥ* // For the meanings of the compound *deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne* according to Abhinavagupta, see Torella 2002: 169, fn. 22). Abhinavagupta explains (ĪPV II 105–106): *naikaikataḥ pramāṇāt sā pravṛttir api tu pramāṇasamūhād eva. samūhatā ca para-sya nopapannā, asmākaṃ tv ekasvasaṃvedanaviśrāntimayī sā yujyate.* “This activity does not [arise] from each means of knowledge taken separately, but rather, from an association of means of knowledge (*pramāṇasamūha*); and the existence of this association is not possible for [our] opponent, whereas from our point of view, it is possible insofar as it consists in the fact that [the various means of knowledge] rest on a single self-awareness.” The opponent mentioned here is a Buddhist who considers that perception is restricted to the knowledge of the particular, whereas concept (*vikalpa*) regards only generalities (*sāmānya*). In contrast, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that the various means of knowledge cooperate – a cooperation made possible by the fact that the various cognitions are in fact nothing but a single consciousness taking at will the various forms of perception or concept, whereas according to their Buddhist opponent, cognitions, whether perceptual or conceptual, are purely momentary and irreducibly distinct from each other. In this regard, Utpaladeva is once again borrowing from Bhartṛhari’s thought: as noted in Aklujkar 1989: 151, “whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy [...] emphasized the separability of the means of cognition [...], the Grammarian-philosophers like Bhartṛhari [...] played down the separability of the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly,” and (*ibid.*, fn. 1) while “thinkers like Dignāga avoid such overlapping of *pramāṇas* by restrict-

said to operate jointly, *āgama* is repeatedly designated as the fundamental means of knowledge that the two others can at best “strengthen.”⁶² Thus, while inference cannot cancel by contradicting it a knowledge gained through *āgama*, inference is cancelled by perception as well as *āgama*, and Abhinavagupta insists in the ĪPV⁶³ that in this regard he is in agreement with Bhartṛhari⁶⁴

ing the object of *pratyakṣa* (to *svalakṣaṇa* [...]), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) *pramāṇas* as basically complex.” See also Houben 1997: 322 and Aklujkar 2010: 388–389.

⁶² Thus in ĪPVV III 255, after explaining that contrary to perception and inference, *āgama* is “capable of knowing everything” (see above, fn. 43), Abhinavagupta adds: *tata eva vivṛtāv avatāryate padārthatat-tvopapādanārtham iti pārameśvarāgama eva tattvam upapādayitum śaktaḥ, yuktis tu tadupabṛmhaṇāya*. “For this very reason, in the *Vivṛti*, [Utpaladeva] introduces [this new section, the *Āgamādhikāra*,] with [the words] ‘in order to explain the real nature of things...’: only the Highest Lord’s *āgama* is capable of accounting for this nature, whereas reason (*yukti*) has to strengthen (*upabṛmhaṇa*) this [account].” In the same passage (*ibid.*: 256), Abhinavagupta quotes a verse according to which “the means of knowledge is one; its speech, which is truthful, is uttered by the Lord [himself]; the human means of knowledge, which are gross (*sthūla*), which cannot invalidate its statement.” (*pramāṇam ekaṃ tadvākyaṃ tathya iśvarabhāṣitam / tasyoktiḥ pauruṣaiḥ sthūlaiḥ pramāṇair na prabādhyate //*). See also e.g. ĪPVV III 98: *prasiddhir eva ekā pramāṇam*. “The means of knowledge is nothing but *prasiddhi* alone.”

⁶³ ĪPV II 84: *tena pratyakṣāgamau bādhakāv anumānasyeti tatrabhavad-bhartṛharinyāyabhāṣyakṛtprabhṛtayaḥ*. “This is why the master Bhartṛhari and the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* for instance [say] that perception and *āgama* can invalidate (*bādhaka*) inference.”

⁶⁴ See e.g. VP 1.31: *dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ / na tāṃl lokaprasiddhatvāt kaścit tarkeṇa bādhate //* “And these paths of merit, which have been determined without interruption, no one can invalidate them through reasoning (*tarka*), because they belong to general certainty (*lokaprasiddha*).” See also VP 1.38: *atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty arṣeṇa cakṣuṣā / ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādh-yate //* “The speech of those who see with the eye of a Seer things that are beyond the range of senses [and] that are not [usually] experienced cannot be invalidated by an inference.” See also VPV 97 *ad* VP 1.40

or the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana.⁶⁵

In the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta gives an even more critical appraisal of the role of reasoning, emphasizing once again its weakness as compared to *āgama* (while once again explicitly referring to Bhartṛhari's VP)⁶⁶ and insisting that it is incapable of leading humanity to

(although modern scholars have been wondering whether the VPV is Bhartṛhari's, Abhinavagupta has no doubt concerning its authorship, as noticed in Iyer 1969: 22: thus in ĪPVV II 226, he quotes VPV 214–215, and introduces it with the words *tad āha tatrābhavān bhartṛhariḥ*, “this is what the master Bhartṛhari has said [in...]”): *tasmāt pratyakṣam āraṣaṃ ca jñānam saty apī virodhe bādhakam anumānasya*. “For this reason, perception and the knowledge of Seers invalidate inference even when there is a contradiction [between them].” Cf. also VP 1.41: *caitanyaṃ iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate / āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate* // “He who relies on *āgama*, which, just as consciousness, exists without interruption, is not refuted (*bādhyate*) by reasonings (*hetuvāda*).”

⁶⁵ See NBh 3 ad NSū 1.1.1; after specifying that inference “rests on perception and *āgama*” (*pratyakṣāgamāśrita*) and after defining *nyāya* as an inquiry through valid means of knowledge, Vātsyāyana adds: *yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgamaviruddham nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti*. “But an inference that is contradicted (*viruddha*) by perception and *āgama* is a pseudo rational inquiry (*nyāyābhāsa*).” On this passage and Vātsyāyana/Pakṣilasvāmin's attempt to “accommodate” his philosophical tradition “with the established religious tradition,” see Preisendanz 2000: 229–230.

⁶⁶ Immediately after the passage of the ĪPVV quoted below (fn. 68), Abhinavagupta quotes in part VP 1.34 (*yatnenānumito'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate* // “Even something that has been inferred with [great] efforts by some skillful experts in inferences is demonstrated [to be] otherwise by others who are more skilful”) and VP 1.132: *sarvo'drṣṭaphalān arthān āgamāt pratipadyate / viparītaṃ ca sarvatra śakyate vaktum āgame* // “Everybody knows the things the results of which are imperceptible through *āgama*; and in all cases, the contrary can be stated in an *āgama*.” (The ĪPVV edition and the BL manuscript bear the reading *phalocitān* “that are appropriate for [a particular] result” instead of *adrṣṭaphalān*, “the results of which are imperceptible.” One could consider that the ĪPVV's reading is a corruption, or that Abhinavagupta's memory is betraying him here – or that he is slightly distorting the quotation so

a final consensual conclusion, since the most powerful reasonings

as to have Bhartṛhari say that *āgama* enables us to know more than just entities that have imperceptible results). VPV 212 explains that VP 1.132 answers the objection according to which *āgama*-s can lead to merit as well as demerit and adds: *etasmin paryanuyoge pratividhīyate: sarveṣv āgameṣu dṛṣṭādrṣṭaphalāsu pratipattiṣu viparītaphalaprapṛtiḥ śakyate prasaṅktum, tasmād āgamaṃ kañcit pramāṇīkṛtya vyavasthite tasmin yā kācid upapattir ucyamānā pratipattāv upodbalakatvaṃ labhate*. “This objection is answered [here in the following way]: since all *āgama*-s [enjoin] the practice of [actions] whether they have visible or invisible results, there follows the possibility that one may obtain [from them] contrary results; therefore, once a certain *āgama* has been set apart [from the others] by taking it as a means of knowledge, the logical explanation (*upapatti*) stated [as regards this particular *āgama*] becomes a means to strengthen (*upodbalaka*) the practice [enjoined in the chosen *āgama*].” I am not sure why Abhinavagupta associates this verse with VP 1.34 (which regards the weakness of inference as a means of knowledge); I assume that here he takes *āgama* in the second, “figurative” sense of the term, i.e. as meaning “scripture” rather than an intense realization, and considers that Bhartṛhari is emphasizing that each religious tradition, while relying on its own scriptures, builds various rational justifications of these scriptures that are contradictory with each other. On the weakness of inferential knowledge according to Bhartṛhari, see e.g. Iyer 1969: 83–85, and Houben 1997: 323–324 and 350, n. 21 (specifying that Bhartṛhari does not “simply reject inference” as was suggested in Frauwallner 1959: 94, “but points out its limitations, if it is used in isolation, without reference to traditional knowledge (*āgama*).”). See also VP 1.30: *na cāgamād⁽¹⁾ ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / ṛṣinām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam // [⁽¹⁾ *na cāgamād* Biardeau 1964 : *nāgamād* VP]. “And without *āgama*, reasoning (*tarka*) cannot determine merit; even the Seers’ knowledge presupposes *āgama*.” Cf. VPV 86 *ad loc.*: *sarve hi vādino dūram api gatvā svabhāvaṃ na vyativartante. adṛṣṭārthānām ca karmaṇām phalāniyame svabhāvasaṃvid āgamapratibaddhā. ko hy anavasthitasādharmyavaidharmyeṣu nityam alabdhaniścayeṣu puruṣatarkeṣu viśvāsaḥ?* “For no philosopher, however far he may venture, goes beyond the nature [of things]; and as regards determining the results of [ritual] acts the objects of which are imperceptible, the knowledge of this nature depends on *āgama* – for what faith [could we have] in human reasonings, which never achieve certainty since the properties of containing merit and demerit remain undetermined in them?” Cf. also VP 1.32 (*avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //**

always appear weaker when seen from the perspective of a different doctrinal system:

To begin with, reasoning cannot apply to everything; and even in the cases where it applies, it is weak (*durbala*), according to the view that [Utpaladeva] has already expounded, because of the difficulty to know the nature of the effect, etc. [And] even a reasoning that is strong in its own house becomes weaker from the point of view of another reasoning developed by somebody who holds a different thesis. And yet, one can find no final conclusion whatsoever to the reasonings that flow from the beginning of *saṃsāra* up to date and are being developed by the six speculative doctrines⁶⁷ and their countless differences.⁶⁸

From this point of view, the Pratyabhijñā's subordination of reason to revelation seems to reflect the Brahmanical contention that reason must be supported by scripture, and it can be compared not only to the positions of Bhartṛhari or Vātsyāyana, but also to those of Advaitavedāntins such as Śaṅkara, Sureśvara or Padmapāda, who also state that reasoning is groundless by itself and that it can only function properly with the help of *āgama*.⁶⁹

"Since things can have different powers due to the differences regarding their conditions, places and times, their knowledge (*prasiddhi*) is extremely difficult to obtain through inference.") and VP 1.42 (*hastasparsād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā / anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ* // "Just as the fall of a blind man who runs on a path [that has an] uneven [ground] by groping around, [that] of [someone] who relies primarily on inference is not unlikely.").

⁶⁷ On the *tarkaṣaṭka* / *ṣaṭtarkī*, see e.g. Gerschheimer 2007.

⁶⁸ ĪPVV III 95: *na tāvat sarvatra nyāyo nirvahati; yatrāpi nirvahati, tatrāpi pūrvoktadṛṣṭyā kāryādirūpasya durjñānatvād durbalaḥ, svagrhe bala-vān api vādyantarotthāpitanyāyāntaradṛśi durbalatarībhavati. tathāpi cādyāpi yāvad āsaṃsāraṃ pravahatām tarkaṣaṭkatadbhedasahasrot-thāpyamānānām nyāyānām na paryavasānaṃ kiñcid api labhyate.*

⁶⁹ See e.g. Halbfass 1983: 40–41 (quoting in particular BSū 2.1.11 on which Śaṅkara comments and which mentions *tarkāpratiṣṭhāna*, "the groundlessness of reasoning"), 45–57 (on Śaṅkara's criticism of inference) and 65–67 (on Sureśvara's and Padmapāda's statements that reason is groundless without revelation).

The paradoxical consequences of Utpaladeva's definition of *āgama*: a scripture only has authority for its followers, and yet all scriptures can be considered valid

However, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers do not content themselves with downplaying the role of reason and emphasizing the importance of *āgama*. To begin with, their definition of *āgama* – which distinguishes between *āgama* as a strong, nonperceptual and non-inferential realization (*vimarśa*) and scriptures as a “mass of words” (*śabdarāśī*) expressing more or less adequately this realization – has somewhat paradoxical consequences that are worth mentioning regarding the authority of scripture.

Thus, as Abhinavagupta's commentaries make clear, according to Utpaladeva, on the one hand, a scripture only has authority for someone who believes in it, whereas for someone who does not, it is no *pramāṇa* at all; and on the other hand, *any* text considered as having scriptural authority in any given religious current is perfectly valid. Thus, in the ĪPV, immediately after stating that a text that is “in accordance” with the strong realization primarily denoted by the word *āgama* is also a kind of *āgama*, and after mentioning as such “the Vedas, the [scriptures of the Śaiva-]siddhānta, etc., or even another [text] such as the scriptures of the Buddhists or [those of] the Jains, etc.,”⁷⁰ Abhinavagupta adds:

For in the speech arising from this [strong realization], such as “I, who am performing the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice], will go to heaven,” “I, who am initiated [in the Śaivasiddhānta doctrine], will not be born again,” “I, who am compassionate, will attain buddhahood,” “I, who am bearing intense pains, will attain the state of a [Jain] saint” – in [such a speech] no error (*viparyaya*) can arise, because only he who has faith in it (*tadāśvasta*) may successfully put into practice [that which is prescribed] in this [scripture], whereas for [anybody] else, because [this speech] does not consist in an intense understanding (*dṛḍhapratipatti*), this speech is not at all a means of knowledge (*apramāṇam eva*), [i.e.] it does not have as its essence such a [strong] realization (*vimarśa*).⁷¹

⁷⁰ See above, fn. 18.

⁷¹ ĪPV II 81–82: *tena hi yac chabdanam utpāditam jyotiṣṭomakāry ahaṃ*

Abhinavagupta's position is quite puzzling at first sight. On the one hand, he states that all scriptures (including those of the Buddhists or Jains) are valid means of knowledge insofar as they express the strong realization that is *āgama* in the literal sense of the term; on the other hand, he considers that a scripture is a valid means of knowledge (insofar as it adequately expresses the realization that gives it its validity) *only for someone who has faith in it*: for a Buddhist, the Vedas are no means of knowledge at all, just as the Buddhist *sūtra*-s are no means of knowledge at all for someone who belongs to the Brahmanical tradition. And yet, both Buddhist and Vedic scriptures are means of knowledge insofar as they are considered by some to convey this strong realization.

Such a statement entails obvious problems which Abhinavagupta himself mentions in the form of objections: how can a scripture be a means of knowledge for some only?⁷² For a means of knowledge is supposed to be universal or "impartial" (*apakṣapātin*),⁷³ just as it is

svargaṃ ganteti dīkṣito'ham apunarāvṛttibhāgīti, kāruṇiko'haṃ buddha-padaṃ ganteti, gāḍhakeśasahiṣṇur aham arhatpadaṃ prapatteti, tatra na viparyaya udeti, tadāśvastasyaiva tatrānuṣṭhānāyogyatvāt, anyasya tu dṛḍhapratipattirūpatvābhāvād apramāṇam eva tathāvimarśānāt-makaṃ⁽¹⁾ *śabdanam*. [⁽¹⁾ *tathāvimarśānāt-makaṃ* conj. : *tathāvimarśānāt-makaṃ* KSTS, *Bhāskari*, J, L, P, B, S1, S2, SOAS]

⁷² IPV II 82: *nanv evaṃ tad eva śāstraṃ kaṃcit prati pramāṇam kaṃcit prati neti syāt, na caitad yuktam apakṣapātitvāt pramāṇasyeti*. "[An objector:] But if it is the case, [then] the same treatise should be a means of knowledge for some [people] and not for others; and this is not possible, because of the [rule] according to which the means of knowledge is impartial (*apakṣapātin*)."

⁷³ This principle occurs, albeit in a different context, in the works of Kashmiri Naiyāyikas such as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa or Bhāsarvajña (Abhinavagupta knows and occasionally quotes or paraphrases these works; for an explicit reference to the NBhūṣ, see e.g. IPVV I 134–135, and Ratié 2011a: 88–91; for a probable paraphrase of the NM, see e.g. IPV I 167–168, and Ratié 2010b: 460, fn. 66). Thus in NM I 264–266, Jayanta argues that a Mīmāṃsaka cannot rightly criticize yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), because his refutation rests on a knowledge of yogic perception that is either a valid means of knowledge (but then, "since the means of knowledge is impartial," *pramāṇasyāpakṣapātitvāt*, the

supposed to be devoid of internal contradictions – but how can all scriptures be means of knowledge, since they contain teachings that are “mutually contradictory”?⁷⁴ By acknowledging that scripture is not universally valid, the Pratyabhijñā treatise seems to undermine its authority; by acknowledging that however different, scriptures are all valid, it seems to doom them to contradiction.

Here is Abhinvagupta’s answer in the ĪPV:

Although you are ignorant of the way knowledge really occurs, [I] will not neglect you [by overlooking your question]. [Now,] what is the meaning of this sentence: “the means of knowledge is impartial”? Does the cognition of blue that is a perception [and] belongs to one [particular subject] make the blue manifest to all? Or does the cognition of smoke [that belongs to one subject make] fire [manifest to all through inference]? And is the *āgama* consisting in the prediction of a *siddha* – [such as] “in the morning you will obtain a treasure thanks to this rite” – a means of knowledge for all[, or just for the individual to whom the *siddha* predicts this]? If [you answer] that [in all these cases, there is] a particular [means of knowledge] for anybody[, but only] in some particular [circumstance, then] in the same way, in the case at hand as well, the speech consisting in an intense realization – which is called *ā-gama*

Mīmāṃsaka must share this *pramāṇa* and acknowledge that his opponent’s understanding of yogic perception is right) or not (but then his very demonstration lacks any ground since it rests on something that is not a means of knowledge). Similarly, in a discussion on the notion of generality (*sāmānya*) that occurs in NBhūṣ 232, an argument showing that a thesis to be refuted leads to an unwanted consequence is rejected on the grounds that either the thesis in question is a knowledge obtained through a *pramāṇa* (but then, “because the means of knowledge is impartial,” *pramāṇasyāpakṣapātivāt*, the validity of this very thesis must be acknowledged) or not (but then one cannot draw any consequence from an invalid knowledge). Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña may have borrowed this principle from a common source that is unknown to me.

⁷⁴ See e.g. the objection stated in ĪPVV III 84: *parasparaviruddhopadeśīno hy āgamāḥ, na ca ya ekasyāgamah, so’nyasyānāgama iti yuktam pramāṇasyāpakṣapātivād iti*. “For scriptures (*āgama*) teach mutually contradicting doctrines; and it is not possible that what is *āgama* for one [person] may not be *āgama* for another, on account of [the rule] according to which the means of knowledge is impartial!”

because it “makes the object known” (-*gama* = *artham gamayati*) “completely” (*ā-* = *samantāt*) – is for sure a means of knowledge for all. In that regard, just as light, a sense organ and so on, insofar as they contribute to the production of an erroneous cognition, contribute to invalidity (*apramāṇatā*), [so that from this point of view they] are not a means of knowledge, and [yet] for all of that, perception, which has the nature of a correct cognition, is absolutely not partial; in the same way, although for a *śūdra* for instance, a speech concerning the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice], etc., contributes to a pseudo *āgama* (*āgamābhāsa*) whose nature is not an intense realization, [and although] for this very reason, it is not a means of knowledge, [nevertheless] insofar as [with respect to other individuals who are not *śūdra*-s] the same [speech] has the status of a means of knowledge since it is useful [as] a means of knowledge characterized as a speech consisting in an authentic *āgama* that has as its essence an intense realization, it cannot be rejected on account of the defect of being impartial. For every *āgama* without exception, whether it consists in injunctions or prohibitions, produces a realization that is necessarily restricted (*niyantrita*) to specific (*niyata*) persons who are qualified [for it] (*adhikārin*) [as well as to a specific] place and time, [specific] auxiliary causes, etc.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ ĪPVII82–83: *atattvājñō'si pratītivṛttasya, tathāpi nopekṣyase. apakṣapāti pramāṇam iti ko'sya vacanasyārthaḥ? yad⁽¹⁾ ekasya nilajñānam pratyakṣarūpaṃ tat kiṃ sarvasya nilaṃ bhāsayati dhūmajñānam vāgnim? tvam prātar nidhim anena vidhinā labdhāsa iti ca yaḥ siddhādeśarūpa āgamaḥ sa kiṃ sarvān prati pramāṇam? atha kasyāpi kadācit kiṃcit, tatthehāpi dṛḍhvimarśarūpaṃ⁽²⁾ śābdanam ā samantād artham gamayatīty āgamasamjñakam pramāṇam sarvasya tāvad bhavati. tatra yathā mithyājñāne sahāyatām bhajamānam ālokaendriyādikam apramāṇatāsacivam apramāṇam, na caitāvatā samyagjñānasvarūpasya pratyakṣasya kācit pakṣapātītā, tathā sa eva jyotiṣṭomādiśabdaḥ śūdrāder adṛḍhvimarśātmany ata evāpramāṇa āgamābhāse sāvīyam vidadhad api dṛḍhvimarśātmakasatyāgamarūpaśābdanalakṣaṇapramāṇopayogitāyām prāmāṇyam bhajan na pakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ⁽³⁾. sarva eva hy āgamo niyatādhikārideśakālasahakāryādiniyantritam eva vimarśam vidhatte, vidhirūpo niṣedhātmā vā. [⁽¹⁾yad B : kiṃ yad J, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, Bhāskarī. ⁽²⁾dṛḍhvimarśarūpaṃ J, L, B, P, S1, S2, SOAS : dṛḍhvimarśanarūpaṃ KSTS, Bhāskarī. ⁽³⁾pakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ conj. : pakṣapātāpakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ L, P, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, Bhāskarī : pratipakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ J. I am conjecturing the latter because I do not understand the reading found*

The means of knowledge that is *āgama* is as universal as perception and inference since generally speaking everybody *may* use it, but just as perception and inference, it is not de facto applied by all subjects in all situations. In the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta also argues that all means of knowledge, including perception and inference, only lead to knowledge in some specific circumstances and for some specific individuals: the fact that a certain individual perceives a given object or grasps through inference the presence of a currently imperceptible object does not entail that all subjects should ipso facto be endowed with his knowledge, and the same holds good for *āgama*, which produces a realization only in some particular circumstances and for those who happen to be qualified (*adhikārin*) for it.⁷⁶

in the editions and most of the consulted manuscripts (I cannot see how impartiality, *apakṣapāta*, could be mentioned as a defect along with partiality), although according to the KSTS edition and the BL manuscript, the parallel passage of the ĪPVV says that *āgama* “cannot be accused of being partial *for instance*” (*na pakṣapātādivācyatārhaḥ*, see below, fn. 76), which might be taken to indicate that *apakṣapāta* is implied as another kind of defect.]

⁷⁶ See ĪPVV III 84–85: *tathā hy apakṣapātītvaṃ kīḍṛk pramāṇasya? kiṃ nu khalu bhoḥ pratyakṣānumāne caitriye maitrasya nīlavahnyādikam avabhāsayato yenāpakṣapātīnī syātām. caitraṃ prati vā yaḥ siddhādeśaḥ prāptas te nidhilābho bhaviteti, sa kiṃ maitrasyāgamaḥ? atha tathājātīye pratyakṣānumāne maitrasyāpi kadācid bhavata ity apakṣapātītā, sā tarhy āgamasyāpy aviśiṣṭā. avaśyaṃ hi saugata-cārvākāder api kvacana pratyayitapuruṣavacasi pratītinirūḍhir bhaved eva. tathā hi dṛḍhvimarśarūpaṃ śabdanam āgama ā samantād arthaṃ gamayatīti tatra yathāivāpramāṇabhūtadvicandrasaṃvedana upayogam upagacchad ālokaendriyādikam apramāṇam, na ceyatā samyakpratyakṣasya pakṣapātītā prasajyate kācit, tathā jyotiṣṭomādivākye sūdrādinām anadhikāriṇām adṛḍhvimarśarūpa āgamābhāsa upayogaṃ vrajann apramāṇabhūto’pi śraddhādaravati dvije dṛḍhvimarśātma-kasamyagāgamarūpaśabdanopayoge prāmāṇyam āśādayan na pakṣapātādivācyatārhaḥ. sarva eva hy āgamo niyatādhikārideśakāladaśa-sahakāriprabhṛtīn āmrśya vidhiniṣedhādivimarśamayaḥ.* “To explain: in what does the impartiality (*apakṣapātītva*) of the means of knowledge consist? Now, could it be that the perception and inference belonging to Caitra make the blue, or fire, etc., manifest for Maitra [as well], so that [one could say] that [these means of knowledge are] impartial? Or

Abhinavagupta further explains that this qualification is once again the result of the Lord's free will, which creates each individual as capable of a particular realization that in turn can be produced only through hearing a particular authoritative source.⁷⁷ He also presents this feature of the system as the reason why scriptures cannot be

[in the same way], is the prediction of a *siddha* given to Caitra, [such as] 'you are going to find a treasure,' an *āgama* for Maitra [as well]? If [you answer] that impartiality [means] that perception and inference, because they are of the same kind [for Caitra and for Maitra], can also arise in Maitra in some circumstances, then the same [impartiality] belongs to *āgama* too; for necessarily, even a Buddhist or a Cārvāka for instance, in some circumstances, must [experience] the intensity of a realization (*pratītinirūḍhi*) with respect to the speech of a trustworthy man. To elaborate – *āgama* is a speech consisting in a strong realization; [it is called *ā-gama* because] it 'makes the object known' (*-gama* = *artham gamayati*) 'completely' (*ā-* = *samantāt*). In this regard, just as light, the sense organs, etc., when contributing in the production of the [illusory] cognition of two moons that is not a means of knowledge, are not means of knowledge [themselves], and yet no partiality ensues for a correct perception; in the same way, in the sentence [enjoining] the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice] for instance, although [scripture] is not a means of knowledge insofar as for *sūdra*-s for instance, who are not qualified (*adhikārin*) [for it], it contributes to producing a pseudo *āgama* (*āgamābhāsa*) that does not consist in a strong realization, [nevertheless], insofar as it reaches the status of a means of knowledge in a twice-born who is full of faith and respect, since [it] is useful [in him] as a speech consisting in a correct *āgama* the nature of which is a strong realization, it cannot be accused of being partial for instance. For every *āgama* without exception consists in a realization – be it an injunction, a prohibition, etc. –, with respect to a specific qualified person (*adhikārin*), a [specific] place, time, condition, [specific] auxiliary causes, etc."

⁷⁷ See ĪPVV III 85: *tataś ca kaścit puruṣaḥ kaṃcid eva devasiddhādyanyatamakaraṇīyocitavimarśam svātmasaṃyojanena vimṛśan bhagavatā sṛṣṭaḥ, anyas tv anyam vimarśam*. "And therefore, by associating [a particular realization] with the self [of a particular man,] the Lord creates a particular man [as] realizing a certain realization only, [one] that is fit to be produced by one among many [possible sources] such as a [particular] god or *siddha*; whereas [he creates] another [particular individual as capable of] another realization [fit to be produced through someone else's speech]."

said to contradict themselves: all scriptures are in fact expressions of the same self-realization of the (Śaiva) universal consciousness, and they only seem to contradict themselves because this unique consciousness determines them as being means of knowledge only in particular, different circumstances, with respect to particular, different objects and for particular, different individuals.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ See e.g. TĀ 35.25 (thus introduced in TĀV XII 369: *nanv evam ekakar-ṭṛkatve'sya vicitro'yaṃ upadeśaḥ kiṃ na parasparasya virudhyed ity āśaṅkyāha...* "Having anticipated the objection: 'But since thus [according to you, āgama-s] have a single author[, namely Śambhu], how could this diverse (vicitra) teaching avoid self-contradiction?', [Abhinavagupta] answers..."): *tasmin viśayavaiviktyād vicitraphaladāyini / citropāyopadeśo'pi na virodhāvaho bhavet //* "In this [āgama] which brings diverse fruits because [it] has distinct objects, even the teaching of diverse paths cannot produce any contradiction." Cf. TĀV XII 370 *ad loc.*: *tasminn ekenaiva śambhunā praṇīte'py āgame vicitrāṇāṃ dharmādīnāṃ upāyānāṃ upadeśo deśakālādhikāryādiviśayabhedam āśritya vicitraphaladātṛtvān na virodhāvaho bhaved aprāmāṇyakāraṇatām na yāyād ity arthaḥ.* "In this āgama, the teaching of the paths of merit, etc. – which are diverse although [this āgama] is given by Śambhu, who is absolutely one – cannot produce any contradiction; that is, it cannot become a cause of invalidity, since it provides fruits that are diverse with respect to the differences concerning e.g. the [particular] place, time and qualified person [of this or that particular teaching]." See also TĀ 35.35ab: *tad eka evāgamo'yaṃ citraś citre'dhikāriṇi /* "Therefore this āgama is in fact one [and yet] diverse (citra) since the qualified person (adhikārin) [as regards its teaching] is diverse." Cf. TSā 193: *tatra saṃvinmātramaye viśvasmin saṃvidi ca vimarśātmikāyām, vimarśasya ca śabdanātmakatāyām siddhāyām, sakalajaganniṣṭhavastunas tadgatasya ca karmaphalasambandhavaicitryasya yad vimarśanaṃ tad eva śāstram iti parameśvarasvabhāvābhinna eva samastāḥ śāstrasamdarbho vastuta ekaphalaprāpaka ekādhikāryuddeśenaiva, tatra tu parameśvaraniyatiśaktimahimnaiva bhāge bhāge rūḍhir lokānām iti.* "As regards [the validity of āgama,] since the universe consists in nothing but consciousness, since consciousness in turn consists in realization, and since the fact that [it] consists in speech has [already] been established, the realization of the reality that pervades the whole universe and of the variety [that arises] within this [reality due to] the relation between acts and [their] fruits is precisely [what we call] a treatise (śāstra). As a consequence, in fact no treatise at all is in any way distinct from the nature of the Highest Lord [and all of them] lead to a single result, since [in fact]

The Pratyabhijñā's inclusivistic strategy and the distinction between "the" āgama and āgama-s

Western readers have often been struck by the fact that a number of Indian philosophers avoid purely and simply discarding other religious currents and their beliefs, and Paul Hacker has shown that this attitude is not a mere display of tolerance but rather an "inclusivism"⁷⁹ – i.e., a tendency to present other religious doctrines as included within one's own instead of openly fighting them – that is in fact a "peculiar mixture of doctrinal tolerance and intolerance,"⁸⁰ since while tolerating the other religious currents, it aims at subordinating them by presenting them as inferior or partial expressions of its own doctrines.⁸¹ However, just as one can rightly question Paul Hacker's contention that this inclusivism is a purely Indian phenomenon,⁸² it should be pointed out that inclusivism is far from being a pan-Indian phenomenon, and while some religious currents simply reject the others' scriptures,⁸³ some scholars have attempted

they address a single qualified person. However, by virtue of the very greatness of the power of necessity (*niyatiśakti*) of the Highest Lord, people [only] rest on this or that part of this [single treatise]."

⁷⁹ "Inklusivismus" – for a summary, short bibliography and critical analysis of P. Hacker's works on inclusivism, see Halbfass 1988: 403–418; see also Houben 1997: 47, n. 11.

⁸⁰ Hacker 1957: 386: "diese eigentümliche Mischung von doktrinärer Toleranz und Intoleranz"

⁸¹ Cf. Halbfass 1988: 411, where inclusivism is defined as "a subordinating identification of the other, the foreign with parts or preliminary stages of one's own sphere. It is not considered to be a process of additive annexation; nor is it a form of syncretism or eclecticism. The other, the foreign is not seen as something that could be added to, or combined with, one's own system; instead, it is something a priori contained in it."

⁸² See e.g. Halbfass 1988: 415–418.

⁸³ Cf. e.g. Kumārila's rejection of non-Brahmanical traditions (even though he endeavours to absorb for instance the Jains' and Buddhists' notion of *ahiṃsā* within the Vedic revelation by stating that the Jains and Buddhists have in fact derived their *ahiṃsā* from the Veda: see Halbfass 1983: 8 and 94–95), Dharmakīrti's sometimes violent criticism of the

to distinguish from these inclusivistic or exclusivistic attitudes a “perspectivism” that fully acknowledges the validity of different perspectives instead of discarding them as inadequate views ultimately superseded by one’s own.⁸⁴ In this respect, does Utpaladeva’s definition of *āgama* betray an inclusivistic or a perspectivistic attitude?

At least some elements in the Pratyabhijñā’s position can be seen as perspectivistic. Thus Abhinavagupta insists that *any* scripture (including the Vaiṣṇavas,’ Buddhists’ or Jains’, and not only the Vedic or the Śaiva scriptures) is to be considered a fully valid means of knowledge in which “there can be no error”:⁸⁵ his commentaries emphasize that any scripture is valid for anybody who has faith in it, and he adds for instance that the Buddha or Kapila (the founder of the Sāṃkhya) are endowed with divine grace and impart it to others.⁸⁶ However, this perspectivistic aspect of the Pratyabhijñā’s

Vedas or Śaṅkara’s “conservative and restrictive” approach to “the problem of religious plurality (Halbfass 1983: 92). These strategical choices are obviously determined by their historical, social and religious context (on the context of Kumārila’s hostility towards heterodox trends and of Dharmakīrti’s reaction to it, see Eltschinger 2007, chapitre 1; cf. Halbfass 1988: 405, which mentions P. Hacker’s opinion that the inclusivistic method “was employed especially by such religious groups as felt themselves inferior to their environment”).

⁸⁴ See e.g. Houben 1995: 16–18 and Houben 1997, where Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism is described thus (317–318): “In a very fundamental way, the validity of different perspectives is accepted. Throughout the *Vākyapadīya*, different viewpoints are discussed in their mutual opposition and complementariness [...]. This would mean that it is beforehand assumed that things appear differently from different points of view, or in different conceptual frameworks. This may be contrasted with the assumption that it is possible to make complete and universally true statements about a thing.”

⁸⁵ In this respect the Pratyabhijñā system appears more “perspectivistic” than Bhartṛhari’s, since the grammarian-philosopher never explicitly acknowledges the validity of Buddhist or Jain scriptures for instance (see below, fn. 105).

⁸⁶ See e.g. ĪPVV III 98: *parameśvarecchāvaśāc ca sugatakapilādayo’pi tat-prasiddhyanupraviṣṭāḥ kṛtā anugrāhyās tān evānyāṃś cānugrahītum*. “And even the Buddha or Kapila for instance, [since they are] pervaded

definition of *āgama* is obviously grounded in a particularly strong inclusivistic attitude:⁸⁷ the statement according to which all scriptures are means of knowledge, far from expressing a relativistic view,⁸⁸ is to be understood in connection with the assertions that the various scriptures are included within an *Ur-āgama* as higher and lower (*ūrdhvādhara*) levels of expression of it, that this hierarchy culminates in the Śaiva nondualistic all-encompassing scriptures,⁸⁹ that these hierarchized scriptures express hierarchized (i.e., more and more thorough) realizations,⁹⁰ and that their fruits are hier-

by this a priori certainty [that is *āgama*] thanks to the will of the Highest Lord, are made fit for receiving grace (*anugrāhya*) so that they and others may receive it."

⁸⁷ Cf. Hanneder 1998: 6, mentioning "the inclusivist hierarchy of Abhinavagupta's school."

⁸⁸ Cf. Lawrence 2003, §44, noticing that "although Abhinavagupta grants validity to disparate scriptural traditions, he is not a relativist."

⁸⁹ See e.g. TĀ 35.30–32: *eka evāgamas tasmāt tatra laukikaśāstrataḥ / prabhṛty ā vaiṣṇavād bauddhāc chaivāt sarvaṃ hi niṣṭhitam // tasya yat tat paraṃ prāpyaṃ dhāma tat trikaśabditam / sarvāvibhedānucchedāt tad eva kulam ucyate // yathordhvādharatābhāksu dehāṅgeṣu vibhediṣu / ekaṃ prāṇitam evaṃ syāt trikaṃ sarveṣu śāstrataḥ //* "In fact *āgama* is one; therefore everything is included in it, from the mundane treatises to the Vaiṣṇava, Buddhist [and] Śaiva [treatises]. The highest [level] attainable among them is the domain called Trika; this same [domain] is called Kula because it is entirely devoid of divisions and interruptions. Just as there is a single life in the limbs of a body [although] they are different [insofar as] they are higher or lower (*ūrdhvādhara*), in the same way, the Trika must be in all [treatises, as is confirmed] by scripture." Abhinavagupta thus quotes the *Kālīkulatantra*, which states e.g. (TĀ 35.34): *puṣpe gandhas tile tailaṃ dehe jīvo jale'mṛtam / yathā tathāiva śāstrāṇāṃ kulam antaḥ pratiṣṭhitam //* "Just as perfume in a flower, just as sesame oil in sesame, just as life in a body, just as nectar in water – just in the same way, Kula resides within [all] treatises."

⁹⁰ See e.g. TSā 193–194 (immediately after Abhinavagupta's statement that all treatises are expressions of the universal consciousness' realization but are differentiated according to the persons that they address, see above, fn. 78): *kecin māyocitabhedaparāmarśātmani vedāgamādiśāstre rūḍhāḥ, anye tathāvidha eva mokṣābhimānena sāmṁkhyā-*

archized insofar as higher scriptures lead to fruits that lower ones cannot provide.⁹¹ The scriptures' variety (*vicitratā*) is in fact a hierarchy (*ūrdhvādharatāsthiti*) that must necessarily be acknowledged because it constitutes the only guarantee that scriptures do

vaiṣṇavaśāstrāḍau, pare tu viviktaśivasvabhāvāmarśanasāre śaivasiddhāntāḍau, anye sarvamayaparamesvaratāmarśanasāre mataṅgādiśāstre, kecit tu viralaviralāḥ samastāvachedabandhyasvātantryānandaparamārthasaṃvinmayaparamesvarasvarūpāmarśanātmani śrītrikaśāstrakrame, kecit tu pūrvapūrvatyāgakrameṇa laṅghanena vety evam ekaphalasiddhir ekasmād evāgamāt. "Some rest on treatises such as the scripture of the Veda, which consists in the realization of differences that are appropriate in [the domain of] *māyā*; others, for instance, on the treatises of the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiṣṇavas, which are of the same sort because of their [similar erroneous] conviction regarding liberation; others [rest] for instance on the Śaivasiddhānta, the essence of which is a realization of Śiva's nature as distinct (*vivikta*) [from the universe and other subjects]; others, on the treatise of the *Mataṅga* for instance, the essence of which is a realization that the nature of the Highest Lord pervades everything; whereas others, particularly rare, [rest] on the method (*krama*) of the treatise of the venerable Trika, the essence of which is a realization of the Highest Lord's nature as consisting in a consciousness whose ultimate reality is a freedom and bliss devoid of any interruption; and some [attain this highest stage] either by progressively abandoning each inferior [step] or by jumping [directly to it] – thus [in fact people] obtain a single fruit from one single *āgama*."

⁹¹ See e.g. TĀ 35.29 (which, according to TĀV XII 372, answers the following objection: *nanv evam api śivād eva yady akhilam idaṃ śāstram uditam, tac chaivavat⁽¹⁾ pāñcarātrādibhyo'pi kasmān na śivātmatvatvam evodiyād iti.* [⁽¹⁾ *tac chaivavat* conj. : *tac chaiva*- KSTS] "But even if this is the case, if all this treatise has come down from Śiva only, then what is the reason why the very identity with Śiva [which constitutes the ultimate liberation] cannot arise from the Pāñcarātra [treatises] and so on as well as from the Śaiva [scriptures]?": *yathā ca tatra pūrvasminn āśrame nottarāśramāt / phalam eti tathā pāñcarātrāḍau na śivātmatām //* "And just as in the [Veda, although it is one,] no result comes from a superior stage of life (*āśrama*) in a stage of life that is inferior, in the same way, there is no identity with Śiva in the Pāñcaratra and so on." Cf. ĪPVV III 101, which explains that although a superior *āgama* can yield the fruits of inferior *āgama*-s, "nevertheless a lower [*āgama*] is not capable of providing the fruits of higher [*āgama*-s]" (*na tv adhara ūrdhvaphaladānasamarthaḥ*).

not contradict themselves and therefore have a validity.⁹² Hierarchy ensures non-contradiction because lower scriptures can be seen as more partial or incomplete aspects of the ultimate *āgama*, so that any statement of these lower scriptures that may seem contradictory with the Śaiva nondualistic doctrine can be explained away as resulting from the incompleteness of the lower scriptures. And yet the validity of lower scriptures cannot be questioned insofar as they are aspects of the ultimate *āgama*. The Pratyabhijñā's strategy therefore consists in avoiding direct confrontation with all other religious trends while claiming to encompass and surpass them:⁹³ the

⁹² See e.g. TĀ 35.38–39ab: *anekāgamapakṣe'pi vācyā viṣayabheditā / avaśyam ūrdhvādharatāsthityā prāmāṇyasiddhaye // anyathā naiva kasyāpi prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati dhruvam* / “Even [if one prefers to acknowledge] the thesis [according to which] *āgama*-s are multiple, in order to establish their validity as means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), one must necessarily admit that they are different with respect to their objects according to their hierarchy (*ūrdhvādharatāsthiti*); [for] otherwise, surely, no validity at all can be established for any of them.” Cf. TĀV XII 377: *ānaikye'py āgamānām prāmāṇyasiddhyartham ūrdhvādharatāsthityā viṣayabheditvam avaśyavācyam, no cet kasyāpy āgamasya parasparapratighātāt prāmāṇyaṃ na siddhyed eveti niscayaḥ. tena kamcit kvacin niyukta ity ādīdṛśā kasyacid evādhikāriṇo niyatopāyopadeśakaṃ śāstraṃ pramāṇam iti bhāvaḥ*. “Even if *āgama*-s are [considered to be] multiple [and not one as we claim], in order to establish their validity as means of knowledge, one must necessarily admit that they are different with respect to their objects according to their hierarchy, [for] if one does not [accept this], no validity can be established for any *āgama*, because they contradict each other – this is certain. One should supply: therefore, according to the view [stated] at first, [which consists in saying] that [scripture] addresses a particular [person] in a particular [circumstance only], a treatise is a means of knowledge only for a particular qualified person (*adhikārin*) [and] while teaching [only] a particular path.”

⁹³ See e.g. the introductory verse to chapter 3.1 of the ĪPK in ĪPV II 195: *yaṃ prāpya sarvāgamasindhusaṅghaḥ pūrṇatvam abhyeti kṛtārthatām ca / taṃ naumy ahaṃ śāmbhavadattvacintāratnaughasāraṃ paramāgamābhidhim* // “I praise this ocean of the supreme *āgama* who has as its essence the multitude of wish-fulfilling gems that is the reality of Śāmbhu [and in which] the convergent rivers that are all the *āgama*-s, when attaining it, become complete (*pūrṇa*) and reach their goal

Buddha and Kapila are to be considered as endowed with grace and capable of endowing the others with it because in fact they are mere expressions of Śiva's self-realization,⁹⁴ and in general, the non-Śaiva scriptures must be respected *because they are ultimately Śaiva*.⁹⁵

(*kṛtārtha*).” Cf. Halbfass 1988: 414, mentioning “among the familiar inclusivistic images [...] the metaphor of the many rivers which are united in the one ocean.”

⁹⁴ See ĪPVV III 97: *na hi buddho nāma niyataḥ kaścit, api tu bhāvanābala-pratīlabdhakṣaṇikādīdṛḥhavimarśaḥ. tasya kṣaṇikādibhāvanopadeśī guruḥ pūrvabuddhas tasyāpy anya iti krameṇānīyatavakṛkatvāt pārameśvaravimarśamayataiva vastutaḥ. evaṃ caturviṃśatitattvabhāvanābhāvitāḥ kapilo mantavyaḥ*. “For what [we call] ‘the Buddha’ is no one in particular; rather, it is the intense realization of that which is momentary for instance, [a realization] obtained through the strength of [mental] cultivation (*bhāvanā*). The master who taught him this [mental] cultivation of what is momentary, etc., is a previous Buddha, and [the master] of the latter is yet another [Buddha]: in this succession, because there is no particular speaking subject, in reality [the Buddha] consists in nothing but the realization of the Highest Lord. [And] Kapila, who has got through [mental] cultivation the [Sāṃkhya’s] twenty-four ontological categories (*tattva*), must be considered in the same way [as a mere realization of the Highest Lord rather than as a particular individual].” Ironically, this inclusivistic strategy with respect to Buddhism and Sāṃkhya sounds like an echo of Kumārila’s famous argument for the authorlessness of the Vedas. Cf. ŚV *Vākya*. 365cd–366: *saṅghātavasya vaktavyam īdṛśaṃ pratisāadhanam // vedasyādhyayanam sarvaṃ gurvādhyanyanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanam yathā //* “One must answer the [objection according to which a sentence] is a [human] collection [of words] with the following counterargument: any recitation of the Veda is preceded by the recitation of a master, because just as today’s [Vedic] recitation, this [previous recitation] is called a ‘recitation of the Veda’.” On this argument see Eltschinger 2007, 148–150.

⁹⁵ See e.g. TĀ 35.36: *sāṃkhyam yogam pāñcarātram vedāṃś caiva na nindayet / yataḥ śivodbhavāḥ sarva iti svacchandaśāsane //* “[It has been said] in the teachings of the *Svacchanda[tantra]* that one should not despise Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and even the Vedas, since they all come from Śiva.” Cf. also the description (unfortunately too long to be quoted here) of the hierarchy of systems according to the scale of ontological levels (*tattva*) given by Kṣemarāja in his PH while he

Thus Abhinavagupta states that all *āgama*-s are valid means of knowledge, and yet not only does he contend that the dissemination of the Ur-*āgama* into a multiplicity of scriptures is the reason why people “go astray” and are “deluded;”⁹⁶ he also specifies that the Veda for instance is wrong and that, as Jürgen Hanneder has put it, “all that goes against it will lead one beyond delusion”.⁹⁷

And since [the lower scriptures], although [they] have seen a part of the reality [expressed] in the higher teachings, have rejected it, it is [only] the state of *māyā* that is found in the lower treatises, because [they only] protect the created universe. And in the venerable treatise of the *Ānanda[tantra]* for instance, the Highest Lord has proclaimed that the [Vedic] Seers’ speech is full of evils (*kleśa*), has uncertain and meagre results [and] is limited. The wise should never take [it] as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇayet*): he must take refuge in the *āgama* that is exclusively Śaiva. That which causes sins according to the [Vedic] Seers’ [speech] leads to a quick realization (*siddhi*) in the teachings of the Left,⁹⁸ since all this [speech] of the Seers is circumscribed to the domain of *māyā*.⁹⁹

explains PH 8: *tadbhūmikāḥ sarvadarśanasthitayah*. “The positions of all systems are theatrical roles (*bhūmikā*) that this [unique Self] takes on.”

⁹⁶ See e.g. TĀ 35.37: *ekasmād āgamāc caite khaṇḍakhaṇḍā vyapoddhṛtāḥ / loke syur āgamās taiś ca jano bhramyati mohitaḥ* // “And from a unique *āgama*, these *āgama*-s must be scattered into various fragments in the world; and it is because of them that people go astray, deluded (*mohita*).”

⁹⁷ Hanneder 1998: 24.

⁹⁸ On the meaning of *vāmaśāsana* here (that Abhinavagupta might want to extend to the whole Śaiva revelation but that might originally have designated more narrowly the Vāmasrotas to which the *Ānandanātra* belongs), see Sanderson 1995: 86, fn. 251, and Hanneder 1998: 24–25.

⁹⁹ TĀ 37.9–12ab: *ūrdhvaśāsanavastvaṃśe dṛṣṭvāpi ca samujjhite / adhaḥ-śāstreṣu māyātvaṃ lakṣyate sargarakṣaṇāt* // *śrīmadānandaśāstrādauproktam ca paramaśīnā / ṛṣivākyam bahukleśam adhruvālpaphalam mitam* // *naiva pramāṇayed vidvān śaivam evāgamaṃ śrayet / yad ārṣe pātahetukaṃ tad asmin vāmaśāsane* // *āśusiddhyai yataḥ sarvam ārṣam māyodarasthitam* /

All scriptures can be considered valid means of knowledge – and yet all scriptures but the Śaivas’ are ultimately erroneous because they are only partial aspects of Śiva’s self-awareness: the Veda for instance only concerns the universal consciousness’ realization of the domain of *māyā*, where objects and subjects appear as fundamentally distinct from each other instead of being grasped as a mere manifestation of consciousness. This scripture is valid insofar as objects and subjects are indeed manifest: the domain of *māyā* is real insofar as it really occurs as a phenomenon; but it is erroneous insofar as it does not include the awareness that objects and subjects have no ontological nature of their own and are mere appearances taken on by Śiva. This distinction as regards the validity of a scripture finds its epistemological background in Utpaladeva’s theory of error (*bhrama*, *bhrānti*), which is said to consist in an incomplete manifestation (*apūrṇakhyāti*):¹⁰⁰ error reveals, but incompletely, and the fact that a knowledge is erroneous becomes manifest when a given realization (e.g. “this is silver”) is cancelled by a subsequent, fuller realization (e.g. “this is not silver but nacre”). According to the Pratyabhijñā, as long as no such subsequent realization cancels a given cognition, this cognition is to be considered as valid: the validity of a realization is ensured by its continuity (*anuvṛtti*).¹⁰¹ This means that, just as a

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. Rastogi 1986, Ratié 2011a: 644–650 and Nemec 2011.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. ĪPV II 77–78, where Abhinavagupta sums up Utpaladeva’s position regarding the definition of the means of knowledge while emphasizing that any cognition which remains uncontradicted (*abādhita*) is to be considered as valid: *ata eva vibhāgaviśeṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣādibhir iha nāyāsito lokah. yad yad abādhitasthairyam ata evāpratihatānuvṛttikaṃ vimarśaphalaṃ vidhatte, tat tad bodharūpaṃ bodhyaniṣṭhaṃ pramāṭṛ-svarūpaviśrāntaṃ pramāṇam iti*. “For this very reason, in this [treatise, we] have not exhausted people with [useless digressions] such as the examination of the characteristics [of the various means of knowledge] according to their particular distinctions: whatever has a lasting state (*sthairyā*) that is not cancelled (*abādhita*), [and that] for this very reason, has as its result a realization (*vimarśa*) the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of which is not impeded, is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) consisting in a cognition (*bodha*), regarding an object of cognition (*bodhya*) [and] resting on the nature of the knowing subject (*pramāṭṛ*).” On the relation between this position and that of Kumārila’s “intrinsic valid-

dreamer has no reason to consider that his perceptions are erroneous until a cancelling realization arises as he wakes up,¹⁰² in the same

ity" (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*), see Ratié 2011a: 650–656. On the notion of *anuvṛtti*, see Torella 2002: 171, n. 28.

¹⁰² See e.g. ĪPV II 240: *yat tu tatra bāhyendriyaviṣayatvaṃ pramātran-tarasādhāraṇyaṃ cakāsti, tad yady api yāvad bhāti tāvat tathaiva, tathāpy uttarakālaṃ prabuddhasya na tatheti parāmarśena tad rūpaṃ nirmūlatvenāvbhātīti bhrāntam. yāni hi pramātrantarāṇi svapne sven-driyāṇi ca bhānti etāni prabodhakālabhāvibhir eva tair abhinnānīti niś-cayaḥ, prabodhakāle ca na tatheti niścayānuvṛttir apahr̥taiva. tenobha-yam api bhrāntam ucyate; bhrāntatvaṃ eva cāsthairyaṃ*. "But although in a [dream, perceived things] appear as being the objects of external sense organs [and] as being common to other subjects [as well, and although] as long as [they] are [thus] manifest, [one considers that they] indeed exist exactly in this way, nonetheless, for someone who has awakened later, thanks to the realization (*parāmarśa*) '[they] are not so!', this form [of things] appears as being eradicated (*nirmūla*), [and it is] therefore erroneous (*bhrānta*). For in a dream, [one has] the certainty that the other subjects and the sense organs of the [subject] himself that are mani-fest are identical with those that will exist when awakening; but when awakening, it is not the case. Therefore the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of cer-tainty is necessarily destroyed. For this reason, the two [properties at-tributed to dream objects, that of being perceived through the external sense organs and that of being shared with other subjects,] are said to be erroneous; and lacking permanence (*asthairyā*) is nothing but being erroneous." See also *ibid.*: 241: *yāvac cānuvṛttisthairyam niścayasya ca-kāsti tāvaj jāgaraḥ. tanmadhya eva ca niścayānuvṛttinirmūlanāt svapna ity avabhāsasāratvād vastūnām svapne'pi dīrghe yatra svapnāntaram sa tadapekṣayā jāgrad eva; jāgradabhimatam api vā dīrghadīrgham kā-lāntare niścayānuvṛttinirodhāj jāgradantarāpekṣayā svapna eveti man-tavyam*. "And as long as the permanence (*sthairyā*), [i.e.] the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of certainty, is manifest, [the state experienced by a given subject is called] the waking state; and because of the eradication (*nirmūlana*) of the continuity of certainty right in the middle of this [state, it is called] a dream. Thus because things have manifestation as their essence, even a long dream in which another[, shorter dream occurs] is nothing but the waking state with respect to this [shorter dream]; or again, a [state] that lasts longer [than these two dreams and is therefore] considered as the waking state [with respect to them] must be acknowledged as a dream with respect to [yet] another waking state, because later the continuity of certainty [regarding this state]

way, as long as someone has faith in a given scripture and as long as his or her faith is not cancelled by a contradicting realization, this scripture must be considered a means of knowledge – but as soon as a contradicting realization arises and is strong enough to cancel it, the former loses any kind of validity because its incompleteness is ipso facto realized:

But in a [case] where, due to the encounter with another *āgama*, the conviction “previously, I was not acting properly” arises in a knowing subject, the [scripture in which so far he had faith] is no *āgama* at all.¹⁰³

A scripture is a valid means of knowledge *only for someone who has faith in it*, and *only as long as he or she has faith in it*: as soon as this faith vanishes, cancelled by a higher realization (*vimarśa*), the follower of a scripture realizes that in fact this scripture was no means of knowledge at all, just as someone who first believes that he sees silver and then realizes that it is nacre understands in hindsight that he never saw silver.¹⁰⁴

One should therefore understand the Pratyabhijñā's assertions that *āgama* is the strongest means of knowledge and that all *āgama*-s are means of knowledge while keeping in mind that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta constantly play with several meanings of the word *āgama*: not only do they distinguish between *āgama* as realization (*vimarśa*) and *āgama* as a mass of words (*śabdarāśi*) claiming to express this realization; they also distinguish between the unique *āgama* that is Śiva's self-realization and the multiple *āgama*-s or realizations that are more or less partial aspects of it. This double dis-

is broken.” On the ontological implications of this definition, see Ratié 2011a: 650–656.

¹⁰³ ĪPVV III 97: *yatra tv anyāgamasamvalanayā pramātuḥ pūrvam evāham ayuktakāry abhavam iti pratyayo jāyate, tatra nāgamatvam eva.*

¹⁰⁴ ĪPV II 113: *tatraiva kāle nedaṃ rajatam abhūd⁽¹⁾ iti hy uttaraḥ parāmarśo na tūditapratyastamitāyāṃ śatahradāyām ivedānīm evedaṃ neti vimarśaḥ.* [⁽¹⁾ *abhūd* B, SOAS, *Bhāskarī* : *hy abhūd* KSTS, J, L, S1, S2; p.n.p. P]. “For the realization that occurs after [the thought ‘this is silver’], far from taking the form ‘now only, this is not [silver]’ as in the case of a lightning disappearing as soon as it has arisen, takes this form: ‘at the very moment [when I thought that this was silver], it was not silver’.”

tion (that could be described as both “vertical” and “horizontal,” following the depiction by Ashok Aklujkar of Bhartṛhari’s use of the word “Veda”)¹⁰⁵ enables the Pratyabhijñā philosophers to absorb the

¹⁰⁵ See Aklujkar 1991: 3–5, distinguishing “two related but different senses” in which Bhartṛhari uses the term Veda and adding that “this is true in a horizontal as well as a vertical way of looking at things” (cf. Aklujkar 2009: 55 and 63–68). While the “vertical double reference” concerns both the “subtle, original form of the texts we know as Veda” and “the texts themselves” (on this first distinction see above, fn. 20), the “horizontal or synchronic [...] double reference” concerns an understanding either “wide” or “narrow” of the word Veda as denoting scriptural texts. According to A. Aklujkar, the narrow meaning only includes *śruti*, *mantra*-s and *Brāhmaṇas* (to which *Upaniṣads* may or may not be added), whereas the wider meaning is virtually all-encompassing, since “all *vidyā-bhedas* or *lores* are Veda, because they consist of words and meanings and because all words and meanings are ultimately reducible to *praṇava*.” A. Aklujkar therefore considers that Bhartṛhari subsumes all scriptures (including non-Brahmanical scriptures) within the category “Veda” in its widest sense (see Aklujkar 1991: 2: Bhartṛhari “does not exclude even the *nāstika āgamas* from the Vedic pail”). However, this interpretation apparently rests on passages of the VP(V) that hardly seem decisive. Thus VP 1.10 does state that the *vidyābheda*-s proceed from the *praṇava* and rest on its main limbs (*aṅga*) and secondary limbs (*upāṅga*), but it gives no clue as to what these “various knowledges” are, and VPV 39 *ad loc.* explains them in a way that does not seem to support A. Aklujkar’s interpretation: *vedākhyasya prasiddhasya brahmaṇo’ṅgebhyo jyautiṣādibhyaḥ śakunajñānādaya upāṅgebhyaś ca svapnavipākayonijñānādayo vidyābhedaḥ prasiddhā loke*. “[These] various knowledges are well known in the world: for instance, the knowledge of omens, which comes from astrology and so on – [i.e.] from a [main] limb of the Brahman well known under the name of Veda –, and for instance, the knowledge of the matrix where dreams mature, which comes from a secondary limb [of the Veda].” The other passage invoked is VP 1.124: *na jātv akartṛkaṃ kaścid āgamaṃ pratipadyate / bījaṃ sarvāgamāpāye trayy evāto vyavasthitā //* “Indeed, nobody considers a traditional treatise (*āgama*) to be authorless; therefore the seed [that remains] once all *āgama*-s have been destroyed is established to be the Triple [Veda] itself.” Here Bhartṛhari might mean that all treatises (including those of the Buddhists and Jains) originally stem from the Veda; however, neither the verse nor VPV 203 specify what these *āgama*-s consist of and whether they include non-

authority of other scriptures within that of the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures, but also to explain why the authority of the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures is far from being unanimously acknowledged: even though they constitute the ultimate means of knowledge, they are not so for most people, because a scripture is a *pramāṇa* only for someone who “has faith in it” (*tadāśvasta*), i.e., who either assumes its authority or understands it as expressing something of which he or she can experience an intense realization (and only as long as this realization lasts), but most people are not capable of this realization – however strong, the means of knowledge that is *āgama* is by no means universal, or rather, universally used. And this is where, in spite of Abhinavagupta’s overt subordination of reason to scripture, the soteriological role of rational inquiry comes into play.

Brahmanical traditions. A. Aklujkar concedes (Aklujkar 1991: 2) that Bhartṛhari “does not refer explicitly to the *nāstika āgama-s*” but argues that this idea would fit well with the grammarian-philosopher’s system (cf. Houben 1995: 306: “Aklujkar does not *prove* that Bhartṛhari understood *āgama* as including non-Brahmanical texts but gives several indications why this seems rather natural.”). One of the indications put forward by A. Aklujkar is the fact that Brahmanical authors such as Kumārila and Jayanta consider that some of the non-Brahmanical scriptures originally stemmed from lost parts of the Veda (Aklujkar 1991: 2). However, it should be noted that contrary to Bhartṛhari, Kumārila or Jayanta *explicitly* state this idea, and what seems striking about Bhartṛhari is rather the fact that even though it often seems implied in the VP, it remains implicit (see e.g. Halbfass 1983: 97: “The universalistic potential of Bhartṛhari’s statements is obvious. Nevertheless, his system remains a closed, thoroughly Veda-oriented system. There is no empirical openness for extra-Vedic viewpoints”). By way of contrast, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers repeatedly and explicitly state that the Buddhist and Jain scriptures are *āgama-s*; and in fact their position in this regard appears much bolder than Kumārila’s or Jayanta’s. Thus according to Kumārila, the Buddhists have ungratefully appropriated and distorted their Brahmanical heritage (see e.g. Halbfass 1983: 94–95), and Jayanta is careful to deny the authority of a number of scriptures that are not widely acknowledged and overtly go against the Brahmanical order (see Wezler 1976 or Hanneder 1998: 9–10), whereas Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta insist that *all* scriptures are valid provided that one has faith in them.

The soteriological role of rational inquiry in the Pratyabhijñā and its relationship to āgama

As we have seen, Abhinavagupta often emphasizes the weakness of reasoning, its dependency on the two other means of knowledge and the superiority of *āgama* over it. However, it would be a mistake to consider his position as an irrationalism:¹⁰⁶ the Pratyabhijñā texts present themselves as a path (*mārga*) capable of leading to ultimate liberation, and one that relies only on experience and a critical examination of other philosophical theses. Abhinavagupta considers these two aspects as essential to the Pratyabhijñā method; thus, as regards the first, he states:

What is taught in this [treatise] is [how to] obtain the real subject merely through an examination (*anveṣaṇā*) of the knowledges [resulting of cognitive acts,] such as “blue,” “pleasure” and so on, which are manifest in the most vivid way.¹⁰⁷

But he also insists that Utpaladeva’s new path is a dialectical one:

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Lawrence, §29: “Abhinavagupta’s subordination of reason along with perception to scripture should not be understood as a species of ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘irrationalism’ which precludes the value of philosophical discourse.” In this regard, Abhinavagupta’s interpretation of the MVT’s statement (17.18) according to which “reasoning” (*tarka*) is higher (*uttara*) than the five other members of Tantric *yoga* is revealing: Abhinavagupta considers that *tarka* is not only the highest member of *yoga*, but also the only one. See TĀ 4.86: *evaṃ yogāṅgam iyati tarke eva na cāparam / antarantaḥparāmarśapāṭavātīśayāya saḥ //* “Thus the members of *yoga* amount to this reasoning alone, and they are nothing else; this [reasoning] induces the extreme vividness of a realization (*parāmarśa*) that is ever more internal.” Jayaratha equates this realization obtained through *tarka* with pure knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*; see TĀV III 93: *śuddhavidyātmanaḥ parāmarśasya...*). On Abhinavagupta’s interpretation of the MVT passage and its frequent departure from the actual meaning of this text, see Vasudeva 2004: 419–421, and A. Padoux’s remarks in Goodall & Rastelli (eds.) forthcoming, s.v. *tarka*.

¹⁰⁷ ĪPV I 18: *sphuṭatarabhāsamānanīlasukhādīpramānveṣaṇādvāreṇaiva pāramārthikapramāṭrīlābha ihopadiśyate*.

In the [path in which this treatise consists,¹⁰⁸ it is] the refutation (*pratikṣepa*) of the opponents' theses [first] considered as possible objections [that] makes clear in the best [possible] way the nature of ultimate reality that [Utpaladeva] is going to explain.¹⁰⁹

Utpaladeva's treatise shows ultimate reality by expounding and critically examining other, apparently valid theses, just as, according to Abhinavagupta, Śiva dialectically unfolds the universe's manifestation.¹¹⁰ Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that the Pratyabhijñā treatise – as all treatises (*śāstra*) that are not scriptures (*āgama*) –¹¹¹ is in fact a long “inference for others” as defined in the Nyāya.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Bhāskarī* I 82: *iha – asmiñ śāstramārge*.

¹⁰⁹ ĪPV I 51: *iha yat paramārtharūpaṃ tad āśaṅkyamānapratipakṣapratikṣepeṇa nirūpayiṣyamāṇaṃ suṣṭhutamāṃ spaṣṭīkṛtaṃ bhavati*.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. the ĪPV's introductory verse to chapter 1.2 of the ĪPK (ĪPV I 51): *pūrvapakṣatayā yena viśvam ābhāsyā bhedataḥ / abhedottarapakṣāntar nīyate taṃ stumaḥ śivam* // “We praise Śiva, who, after manifesting the universe as the prima facie view (*pūrvapakṣa*) through differentiation, leads [it] to the ultimate thesis (*uttarapakṣa*) that is non-difference (*abheda*).”

¹¹¹ See ĪPV II 127: *tad dhi parasya pratipattyai, sā ca parārthānumānāt, tatra ca pratijñāder upayoga iti. tat paripūrṇaparapratipattikāri paramārthataḥ sakalam eva śāstraṃ parārthānumānam āgamavyatiriktaṃ nyāyanirmāṇavedhasākṣapādena nirūpitam*. “For the [treatise] is meant for the others' understanding, and this [understanding arises] from an inference for others; and the [five members of the inference, i.e.] the thesis to be proven, etc., contribute to it. Akṣapāda, the founder of Nyāya, has explained that except for scriptures, any treatise (*śāstra*) without exception is in fact an inference for others that leads the others to a complete understanding.”

¹¹² See e.g. ĪPV I 25: *evaṃ pratijñātavyasamastavastusaṃgrahaṇenedaṃ vākyam uddeśarūpaṃ pratijñāpiṇḍātmakaṃ ca, madhyagrantha tu hetvādinirūpaka iti prakāṣito mayeti cāntyaśloko nigamanagrantha ity evaṃ pañcāvayavātmakaṃ idaṃ śāstraṃ paravyutpattiphalam*. “Thus, since this sentence [in the first verse] contains all the things to be proven [in the treatise], it takes the form of the statement of the themes [developed in the treatise] and consists in the summary of the thesis to be proven (*pratijñā*) [that constitutes the first member of a five-membered inference]; whereas between [this introductory sentence and the last sen-

From the very beginning of the treatise though, Utpaladeva specifies that the Self (understood as the unique, all-encompassing consciousness that manifests the universe and that the Śaiva *āgama*-s call Śiva) cannot be either proved or refuted, precisely because it is “always already established” (*ādisiddha*):¹¹³ because individuals are in fact nothing but this universal Self choosing to apprehend itself in the various forms of individuals, the treatise’s goal is not to

tence,] the treatise expounds the [inference’s] reason (*hetu*) as well as the [example (*udāharaṇa*) and the application to the case at hand (*upanaya*)]; and the last verse – which begins with ‘thus I have explained...’ is the [inference’s] conclusion (*nigamana*). Thus, this five-membered treatise (*pañcāvayava*) has as its benefit the instruction of others.” On the five-membered inference as described in the Nyāya, see NSū 1.1.32 (*pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ*. “The members are the thesis to be proven, the reason, the example, the application to the case at hand [and] the conclusion”) and its interpretation e.g. in NM I 18: *parārthānumānavākyaikadeśabhūtāḥ pratijñādayo’vayavāḥ*. “The members that are the thesis to be proven and so on are gathered in a sentence [that constitutes] the inference for others.” On the Pratyabhijñā treatise as a long “inference for others,” see also ĪPV II 126: *parārthānumānātmakam hi śāstram, tatra ca pramāṇādiṣoḍaśa-padārthatattvamayatvam eva paramārthaḥ*. “For the treatise consists in an inference for others, and its ultimate nature is nothing but its consisting in [the examination of] the real nature of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*) that are the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), etc., [mentioned in the first Nyāya aphorism].” Cf. ĪPVV III 182: *tatprakaṣaṇāyedaṃ pūrṇaparārthānumānarūpaṃ pramāṇādinigrahassthānaparyantapadārthaṣoḍaśakanibandhanena samyakparavyutpattisaṃpādanasamarthaṃ śāstram*. “This treatise, which consists in a complete inference for others [and] the goal of which is to make this [identity between one-self and the Lord] manifest, has the power to provide the others with a complete instruction by relying on the sixteen categories [mentioned at the beginning of the Nyāyasūtra,] from the means of knowledge to the point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*).”

¹¹³ ĪPK 1.1.2: *kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare / ajaḍātmā niṣedham vā siddhiṃ vā vidadhīta kaḥ* // “What sentient self could produce either the refutation or the demonstration [of the existence of] the agent, the knowing subject, the Self that is always already established, the Great Lord?” See Ratié 2007: 361–362, fn. 98 and Ratié 2011a: 23–31.

prove the existence of the Self, since whoever is conscious is aware of this existence in the most immediate way, i.e., through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Nonetheless, because individuals are somehow distracted from their own experience by virtue of consciousness' power of freely concealing from itself what it knows,¹¹⁴ they must be led to recognize themselves as this very Self, and such a recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) can be brought about by making obvious (*āviṣkaraṇa*) the powers (*śakti*) of this omnipotent consciousness within the individual subject.¹¹⁵ Although the treatise cannot prove the existence of the Self, it can trigger recognition because it is not an inference resting on a "reason that is an effect" (*kāryahetu*)¹¹⁶ but on a "reason that is a nature" (*svabhāvahetu*):¹¹⁷ it aims at showing that the individual is the Lord by making obvious that the very nature (*svabhāva*) of the individual self implies its identity with the Lord, just as the very nature of a *śiṃśapā* implies its being a tree. According to the Buddhist logicians from whom Utpaladeva borrows this terminology, such an inference does not establish the existence of the thing itself (*vastu*) but only a particular usage (*vyavahāra*). The inference "this is a tree because this is a *śiṃśapā*" only justifies the use of the word "tree" with respect to the object called *śiṃśapā* by relying on some properties that the tree and the *śiṃśapā* share (such as having branches).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ See e.g. Ratié 2010a on what TĀ 4.10–11 for instance describes as consciousness' ability to "play at dissimulating oneself" (*svātma-pracchādanakrīḍā*) while its own nature remains manifest.

¹¹⁵ See ĪPK, 1.1.3: *kiṃtu mohavaśād asmin dṛṣṭe'py anupalakṣite / śaktyāvi-ṣkaraṇeneyam pratyabhijñopadarśyate //* "However, since the [Self], although perceived (*dṛṣṭa*), is not noticed (*anupalakṣita*) because of a delusion (*moha*), this recognition is shown through making [its] powers obvious (*śaktyāviṣkaraṇa*)."

¹¹⁶ I.e., the ĪPK do not attempt to prove the existence of the Self as one would prove the existence of fire through that of smoke (contrary to the Naiyāyikas for instance, who ground their inference of *īśvara* on a *kāryahetu* inference – see above, fn. 43).

¹¹⁷ See Torella 2002: 173, fn. 33.

¹¹⁸ See e.g. NBṬ 106–107: *yatra pracuraśiṃśape deśe'viditaśiṃśapāvyavahāro jaḍo yadā kenacid uccāṃ śiṃśapām upādarśyocyate'yam vṛkṣa iti*

Thus, anticipating the objection according to which the treatise has no point if no means of knowledge can establish the Self,¹¹⁹ Utpaladeva explains that the rational enquiry in which the treatise consists only establishes a certain usage:

It is only that manifesting (*prakāśa*) the powers [of the Self through the treatise] makes possible the usage [of the terms] “Lord,” etc., which were not used before with respect to this [Self] because of delusion.¹²⁰

tad āsau jāḍyāc chiṁśapāyā uccatvam api vṛkṣavyavahārasya nimittam avasyati tadā yām evānuccāṁ paśyati śiṁśapāṁ tām evāvṛkṣam avasyati. sa mūḍhaḥ śiṁśapāmātranimitte vṛkṣavyavahāre pravartyate. noccatvādi nimittāntaram iha vṛkṣavyavahārasya. api tu śiṁśapātvamātram nimittam; śiṁśapāgataśākhādimattvam nimittam ity arthaḥ. “When, in an area where *śiṁśapā*-s abound, someone says to an idiot who does not know the usage (*vyavahāra*) [of the word] *śiṁśapā*, while showing him a big *śiṁśapā*, ‘this is a tree,’ this [person], out of stupidity, will judge that the cause of this usage of the [word] ‘tree’ is the *śiṁśapā*’s height, so that upon seeing a small *śiṁśapā*, he will judge that it is not a tree. This confused [mind] must be led to understand that the usage [of the word] ‘tree’ has no cause but the *śiṁśapā* [itself]. [For] in this case, there is no other cause – such as height for instance – of the usage [of the word] ‘tree;’ rather, this cause is nothing but the fact of being a *śiṁśapā* – i.e., this cause is the fact that [the properties] such as having branches, etc., [which are the causes for calling something ‘a tree’], are found in the *śiṁśapā*.” Cf. e.g. ĪPVV I 87: *nanu ca siddhe vastuni yat pramāṇam, tat kila vyavahārasāadhanam iti prasiddham*. “But it is well known that surely, the means of knowledge with respect to an entity [the existence of which is already] established only establishes a usage.”

¹¹⁹ This is the way Abhinavagupta presents ĪPK 2.3.17. See ĪPV II 126: *nanv evaṁ yadi bhagavati pramāṇam anupayogy anupapatti ca kimarthaṁ tadviśayaṁ śāstram? tad dhi pramāṇam eva*. “[An objector:] But if thus a means of knowledge plays no role and is not even possible with respect to the Lord, what is a point of a treatise having this [Lord] as its object? For the treatise is nothing but a means of knowledge!” Cf. ĪPVV III 165: *yadi na sarvātmanā bhagavati pramāṇasyopapattyupayogau, kiṁ tarhi śāstreṇeti śaṅkāśāntyai sūtram*. “The [next] verse aims at answering this question: ‘If there is absolutely no possibility nor usefulness of the means of knowledge with respect to the Lord, then what is the point of the treatise?’”

¹²⁰ ĪPK 2.3.17: *apravartitapūrvō’tra kevalam mūḍhatāvaśāt / śaktiprakāśeṇādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate //*

The aim of the treatise is a recognition, which is not a new knowledge, but the realization that one already possesses a knowledge¹²¹ – a goal that the *svabhāva* inference can achieve precisely because it establishes no new knowledge but a mere usage; and according to Abhinavagupta, this type of inference merely leads the subject who hears it to pay attention to his or her own experience. Thus when explaining to someone that the object which he or she sees is a pot, we only incite him or her to pay attention to the fact that this perceived entity can rightly be called a pot since it possesses properties (being a container, having this particular form, etc.) included in the definition of a pot that he or she already knows. Accordingly, the treatise's inference just prompts the subject to focus on his or her own experience by pointing out what he or she already knows in the most immediate way without paying attention to this knowledge.¹²² Utpaladeva's elaborate phenomenological analyses of memory, imagination, perception, intentionality, etc., all point out the boundless creative freedom (*svātantrya*) of the individual's consciousness – a freedom which is the essence of the Lord described by the Śaiva scriptures – so as to enable the deluded individual, who no longer pays attention to his or her own experience and therefore sees him-

¹²¹ See e.g. ĪPV I 20, where Abhinavagupta explains that the goal of the treatise is not a cognition but a re-cognition (*praty-abhijñā*, where *praty-* stands for *pratīpam*, “again”) for the following reason: *pratīpam iti svātmāvabhāso hi nābhūtapūrvō*⁽¹⁾ *vicchinna prakāśatvāt tasya*. [⁽¹⁾ *nābhūtapūrvō* J, L, S1, S2, SOAS: *nānanubhūtapūrvō* Bhāskarī, KSTS : p.n.p. P]. “[It is a] *re*-[cognition] because the Self's manifestation is not [something] that did not exist before, because its manifestation is never interrupted.”

¹²² ĪPVV I 87: *loke jaḍaviṣaye yad vyavahāramātrasya sādhanam tad apīhā-jaḍe kriyamāṇam pradarśanena samam avikalam pradarśanamātrāvaśeṣam pradarśanena ca paśya paśyety avadhānadāpanārūpeṇa tulyam*. “When the establishment of a mere usage, which is performed in the world with respect to an insentient object, is [performed] with respect to the sentient [Self], it is ‘entirely similar to [the act of] pointing out (*pradarśana*)’ – [i.e.], it amounts to nothing but [an act of] pointing out, and it is equivalent to the act of showing that consists in making [someone] pay attention (*avadhānadāpānā*) [to something by saying] ‘See! See!’.”

or herself as limited and passive, to recognize him- or herself in this all-powerful Lord.¹²³

¹²³ See e.g. ĪPVV III 181: *so'neneccchādīśaktiprabhāvaprakhyāpakena pūr-
ṇaparārthānumānarūpeṇa vyavahārasāadhanena pratyabhijñākhyena
śāstreṇāvabodhyate. yathā hi bhautāḥ kaścīn mohād apahāritamṇya
evaṃ bodhyate: kaḥ khalu bhavān yasyedṛṇmukham īdṛgvastram iti cet,
sa śvātmany etad iti punaḥ punar abhidadhatā na cāpūrvam asyotpā-
ditam kiṃcit, tathaiva paśuloko bhāsamāna eva svātmani nāham īśvara
ityādi mohād abhimanyamāno vibodhyate. yatra khalu jñānādīśaktayaḥ
sa īśvara iti vyavahriyate tanmātranimitakatvāt tadvyavahārasya yathā
purāṇādiprasiddhaḥ; tvayy api ca tāḥ santīti. athavā yatra yad āyattam sa
tatreśvaro rājeva nīje rājye; tathā ca tvayi viśvam. yallagnaṃ yad bhāti tat
tena pūrṇam nidhānakumbha iva ratnaiḥ; tvayi ca lagnaṃ viśvam bhātīti.
yasya yad antarvarti bhāti sa tāvati vyāpako ratneṣv iva maṇibhāvaḥ
śiṃśapādiṣv iva vṛkṣatvam; tvayi ca saṃvidrūpe dharādisadāśivāntam
śāstraprakriyādyavagataṃ viśvam antarvarti bhāti. yasmin sati yad ude-
ti līyate ca tat tatpūrvāparabhāgavyāpi bhūmāv ivāṅkuraḥ; tathā ca tvayi
prakāśarūpe viśvam iti. evam īśvaratvavyāpitvanityatvadharmā vyava-
haraṇīyāḥ, anye'py āgamoktāḥ sahasraśaḥ śaktiśabdavācyā dharmāḥ.
“The [deluded subject] is awakened by this treatise called Pratyabhijñā,
which makes obvious his might (*prabhāva*)[, i.e. his] powers (*śakti*) of
will, [knowledge and action,] which consists in a complete inference
for others[, and] which establishes a [mere] usage. For one wakes up
alienated people (*paśuloka*) who, because of a delusion (*moha*), believe
such [things] as ‘I am not the Lord’ whereas their Self is perfectly ma-
nifest, just as one awakens someone who is possessed (*bhauta*), [i.e.,
someone] who, because of a delusion, believes that he has been taken
away [from his own body – i.e., by telling him:] ‘Now, who are you?’
and if [he answers:] ‘[someone] who has such a face, such a garment,’
by telling [him] again and again ‘See! This is in yourself!’ – and [such
a speech] produces no new [knowledge] in this [individual, but a mere
recognition. Accordingly, alienated people can be awakened by telling
them this:] ‘Now, the [word] ‘Lord’ is used to denote (*vyavahriyate*)
that in which the powers (*śakti*) of knowledge, [memory and exclu-
sion are found], because the usage (*vyavahāra*) of this [word] has as its
sole cause the [possession of powers], as [in the case of the Lord] who
is well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas and so on; and these
[powers] are [found] in you too.’ Or [one might say: ‘That on which [a
thing] depends is the lord of that [thing], as a king is [the lord] of his
kingdom [because his kingdom depends on him]; and in the same way,
the universe depends on you. That in which a [thing] that is manifest
rests is full of this [manifest thing], just as a pot containing a treasure*

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus present reason's power as merely cathartic: reason can only *eliminate* wrong opinions that distract the individual from his or her own most inner and undeniable experience,¹²⁴ and it can do so by *purifying* experience from the wrong philosophical theses (developed by non-Śaiva opponents) that cover or "soil" it while claiming to interpret it,¹²⁵ as Utpaladeva

[is full] of jewels; and it is while resting in you that the universe is manifest. That inside of which [a thing] is manifest pervades this [thing], just as the [property] of being a gem [pervades] the jewels, [or] just as the [property] of being a tree pervades the *śimśapā* and [other varieties of trees]; and the universe, apprehended for instance according to the cosmic order [described by the Śaiva] treatises [as unfolding] from the [ontological category of] the earth up to [that of] Sadāśiva, is manifest inside of you whose nature is consciousness. That which keeps existing while [a thing] arises and dissolves in it pervades the prior and posterior aspects of this [thing], just as a sprout [arises and dissolves] in the earth; and in the same way, the universe [arises and dissolves] in you whose nature is a manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*). Thus the properties that are sovereignty (*īśvaratva*), omnipresence (*vyāpitva*) and permanence (*nityatva*) can be used (*vyavaharaṇīya*) [with respect to you,] as well as innumerable other properties that are called powers and described in the scriptures (*āgama-s*)."

¹²⁴ See e.g. ĪPV II 129, where Abhinavagupta explains *kevalam* ("It is only that....," see fn. 120 above) in ĪPK 2.3.17: *kevalam iti na tu kiṃcid apūrvam kriyate, nāpi tattvato'prakāśamānam prakāśyate, prakāśamāna eva yanna prakāśata ity abhimananam tad apasāryate*. " 'It is only that' [means]: it is certainly not that [the treatise] would produce some new [knowledge]; it is not either that [it] would make manifest [something] that is not manifest by nature; it is [only that the treatise] removes the opinion according to which [something] is not manifest whereas [in fact this thing] is manifest."

¹²⁵ From this point of view, the position adopted by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta is not without affinities with that of their Buddhist opponents. See e.g. Krasser 2004: 134 and 145–146, which sums up how Dignāga, Dharmakīrti or Dharmottara conceive the aim of their epistemology in the following way: "1/ The addressees of epistemological works are primarily non-Buddhists. 2/ The aim of these works is not to introduce the opponents to the teaching of Buddha, but to turn the adherents of heretical views away from these views by revealing the faults in the *pramāṇa* theories of the heretics and by revealing the good qualities of

insists while concluding his lost *Vivṛti*:¹²⁶

Having thus reduced to silence those who, denying their [own] self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*), hold this or that thesis, I have made obvious through clear reasonings (*yukti*) the true nature of the subject [so far] soiled (*kaluṣīkṛta*) by them.¹²⁷

In this respect, it is worth noting that the two entities to be recognized as having the same nature through the *svabhāva* inference are on the one hand one's own subjectivity (which is always already experienced through a self-awareness that qualifies as *āgama* in the primary sense of the term, i.e., as an intense and undeniable realization, *vimarśa*), and on the other hand, the Lord who is well known (*prasiddha*) through such texts as Purāṇas and *āgama*-s:¹²⁸ the trea-

one's own *pramāṇas*. 3/ Although the Buddhist *dharma* is not subject to a critical analysis by means of conventional valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*), it has to be examined as long as confused opponents lead the world astray." See also Eltschinger 2008: 525: "Il est remarquable que l'un et l'autre textes [bouddhiques] tiennent les méprises adverses pour la seule raison d'être de l'entreprise logico-épistémologique. En d'autres termes, ce en quoi nous sommes disposés à reconnaître de la philosophie [...] n'a pas tant vocation sotériologique que vocation réfutative, défensive et apologétique, conformément au programme traditionnellement assigné à la *hetuvidyā*. N'étaient les erreurs des hérétiques en matière de logique et de théorie de la connaissance, nos auteurs se seraient dispensés de composer des traités de ce type."

¹²⁶ The verse is quoted in full in ĪPVI 130 (*ad* ĪPK 1.4.3), and in all probability it was the first of a series of verses concluding the lost *Vivṛti*. See ĪPVV III 404, which seems to briefly gloss a part of it: *vivṛtikāraḥ saṃkṣipyā sarvaṃ āhettham ity ādiślokaḥ. anenāsmadukteneśvaratāprakāreṇa yā svasaṃvittiḥ⁽¹⁾ sthitā tām*. [⁽¹⁾ *svasaṃvittiḥ* conj. : *susaṃvittiḥ* KSTS]. "The author of the *Vivṛti* says everything in a nutshell with the verses beginning with 'Thus...' (*ittham*). '[Their] self-awareness (*yā svasaṃvittiḥ*... *tām*)' [means the self-awareness] that occurs in the way that we have described, [i.e., the awareness of oneself] as identical with the Lord."

¹²⁷ *ittham svasaṃvittim apahnuvānair yat tad vadadbhiḥ kaluṣīkṛtaṃ yat / pramāṭṛtattvaṃ sphuṭayuktibhis tām mūkān vidhāya prakāṭikṛtaṃ tat //*.

¹²⁸ See e.g. ĪPVV III 181 (quoted above, fn. 123), which defines the term "Lord" while using the example of the Lord "well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas and so on" and explains that the treatise's infe-

tise's inference is thus aimed at bringing about the awareness of the

rence must show that the powers (*śakti*) "described in the scriptures" (*āgamokta*) can be attributed to the individual subject. See also ĪPVI 43–44: *tad ayaṃ pramātā jñānakriyāśaktiyogād īśvara iti vyavahartavyaḥ purāṇāgamādiprasiddheśvaravat*. "Therefore one must use (*vyavahartavya*) [the word] 'Lord' with respect to this subject, because [he] possesses the powers of knowledge and action, just as in the case of the Lord well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas, the *āgama*-s and so on." Cf. ĪPVV I 32: *yat yaj jñānakriyāsvatantram tad īśvaraḥ purāṇāgamasiddha iva*. "Whatever is free as regards knowledge and action is a Lord, just as [the Lord] known (*siddha*) through Purāṇas and *āgama*-s." See also ĪPVI 20: *pratyabhijñā ca bhātabhāsamānarūpānusaṃdhānātmikā, sa evāyaṃ caitra iti pratisaṃdhānenābhimukhībhūte vastuni jñānam; loke'py etatputra evaṃguṇa evaṃrūpaka ity evaṃ vā, antato'pi sāmānyātmanā vā jñātasya punar abhimukhībhāvāvasare pratisaṃdhi⁽¹⁾prāṇitam eva jñānam pratyabhijñēti vyavahriyate; nṛpatiṃ⁽²⁾ pratyabhijñāpito'yam ity ādau. ihāpi prasiddhe⁽³⁾ purāṇasiddhāntāgamānumānādividitapūrṇaśaktisvabhāva īśvare sati svātmany abhimukhībhūte tatpratisaṃdhānena jñānam udeti, nūnam sa eva īśvaro'ham iti.* [⁽¹⁾*pratisaṃdhi*- *Bhāskarī*, J : *pratisaṃdhita*- KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P. ⁽²⁾*nṛpatiṃ* conj. Sander- son, S1 : *nṛpatiṃ prati* KSTS, J, L, S2, SOAS : *nṛpaṃ prati Bhāskarī*; p.n.p. P. ⁽³⁾*prasiddhe* conj. : *prasiddha*- J, L, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, *Bhāskarī*; p.n.p. P.] "And recognition, which consists in the synthesis of a form that has been manifested and of a form that is being manifest, is the knowledge [that arises] with respect to a thing that is present, through a synthesis [thus expressed]: 'But this is Caitra!'. In the world too, when [one says for instance] 'this [man] has been made to recognize the king,' the word 'recognition' is used to denote a knowledge that exclusively rests on the synthesis [occurring] when one is again in the presence of [somebody] who is [already] known either in this way: 'this is the son of that [particular man], he has these [particular qualities], he has this [particular] appearance' – or [only] in part, in a general way [and not as a particular individual]. In the [case of the Recognition of the Lord] as well, since the Lord is [already] well known (*prasiddha*), [as] the nature of his full power is [already] known through the Purāṇas, the *āgama*-s of the [Śaiva]siddhānta, inference, etc., [and] since the Self is [ever] present [to the subject], a knowledge arises through the synthesis of these two [knowledges] in this form: 'indeed I am this Lord!'" My understanding of this famous but difficult passage has changed over the years (the translation in Ratié 2006: 97, should be corrected accordingly), although I still have many doubts. Bhāskarakaṇṭha for instance justifies at length the reading *nṛpaṃ prati pratyabhijñāpito'yam*, "this [man]

identity of *āgama* in the secondary sense of the term (i.e., the Śaiva scriptures) with *āgama* in the first sense of term (i.e., the subject's constant self-realization). However, Abhinavagupta adds that even if there is no *prasiddhi* of the Lord through any kind of religious text, the mere understanding of the term "lord" in a strictly worldly context is enough to make the inference possible.¹²⁹ The path of the

has been made to be recognized in front of the king" (see Ratié 2011a: 239, fn. 139, on this passage of the *Bhāskarī* I 37); however, the reading *nṛpatim pratyabhijñāpito'yam* ("this [man] has been made to recognize the king") seems much more likely, among other reasons because the Pratyabhijñā's goal is to make people recognize the Lord (as being themselves). The compound *prasiddhapurāṇasiddhāntāgamānumānādividitapūrṇaśaktisvabhāve* is particularly problematic, both because of *prasiddha*- (which seems redundant with *-vidita*; A. Sanderson had conjectured *prasiddhi*:- see Ratié 2006: 97, but the mention of *prasiddhi* as distinct from Purāṇas and *āgama*-s is somewhat puzzling) and because of the surprising mention of inference as one of the sources of our a priori certainty regarding the Lord's full power. One might suspect a corruption here, all the more since in ĪPV I 32 (quoted above), only Purāṇas and *āgama*-s are mentioned, and in ĪPV I 43–44 (also quoted above), the *-ādi* in *purāṇāgamādi*- is omitted in L, S1 and S2. However, I hesitate to emend since Abhinavagupta might have in mind the well-known *kāryahetu* inference of the Lord put forward by the Naiyāyikas (see above, fn. 43).

¹²⁹ See ĪPV I 44: *tadaprasiddhāv api sarvaviṣayajñānakriyāśaktimattvasvabhāvam evaiśvaryaṃ tanmātrānubandhitvād eva siddham; tad api ca kalpitesvare rājādau tathā vyāptigrahaṇāt, yo yāvati jñātā kartā ca sa tāvatīśvaro rājevānīśvarasya jñātṛtvakarṭṛtve svabhāvaviruddhe yataḥ, ātmā ca viśvatra jñātā kartā ceti siddhā pratyabhijñā*. "Even if there is no a priori certainty of this [Lord through the Purāṇas and *āgama*-s,] sovereignty is established to have as its only nature the possession of the powers of knowledge and action with respect to all objects from the mere fact that [sovereignty's nature] depends on nothing more than these [powers] (*tanmātrānubandhin*); moreover, it is the same in the case of a created lord such as a king, because one grasps this invariable concomitance: whoever is the knower and agent of [something], however extended [that thing is,] is its lord, since being a knower and an agent are contradictory with the nature of someone who is not a lord, and the Self is the knower and agent with respect to everything – therefore recognition is established." Abhinavagupta is relying here on

Pratyabhijñā is open to those who are perfectly alien to the Śaiva tradition and who do not know or at least do not acknowledge¹³⁰ the Śaiva scriptures; and whereas the various scriptures are said to be fit for particular qualified persons (*adhikārin*), “anybody who was born” is qualified to hear or read Utpaladeva’s treatise,¹³¹ since it is primarily meant to convince those who do not belong to a Śaiva nondualistic current by giving them the realization (*vimarśa*) that they cannot get through the mere reading or hearing of the Śaiva scriptures as they do not “have faith in it” (*tadāśvasta*). Thus, while explaining in what way the treatise is a “new” (*nava*, *abhinava*) path, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta insist that this path was in fact already contained in “all the esoteric treatises,” but that it was so far *aprasiddha*, “not well known” – or “not known through an a priori certainty” – because it was “hidden” in them.¹³² However, they do not rest content with

Dharmakīrti’s terminology: on Dharmakīrti’s use of the compound *tan-mātrānubandhin*, “depending on nothing more than that” in connection with the notion of nature (*svabhāva*), see e.g. PVSV 19 (ll. 20–21).

¹³⁰ See e.g. ĪPVV I 32: *purāṇādisiddhe’pīśvare’naṅgikriyamāṇe grhagrāmamaṇḍaleśvaraprasiddhau tadviṣayāpratihatajñānakaraṇa evaiśvarasya lakṣaṇam, te ca pramāṭṛtattve sarvaviṣaye’pratihata eveti*. “Even if [someone] does not acknowledge [the existence of] the Lord although it is known through the Purāṇas and so on, since [this person has at least] the a priori certainty of the Lord [as master] of the house, the village or the State, [he knows that] unlimited knowledge and action with respect to these objects constitute the definition of sovereignty; and within the reality that is the subject, these are absolutely unlimited with respect to every object.”

¹³¹ See Ratié 2009: 351, fn. 8.

¹³² See ĪPV II 271: *abhinavaḥ – sarvarahasyaśāstrāntargataḥ samnigūḍhātvād aprasiddhaḥ*. “[This] new (*abhinava*) [path, i.e. this path] that was contained in all the esoteric treatises (*rahasyaśāstra*) but that was not well known (*aprasiddha*), because [so far] it was hidden (*samnigūḍha*) [in them]...” Utpaladeva himself seems to have developed this idea in his lost *Vivṛti*. See e.g. the fragmentary quote in ĪPVV III 401: *aspaṣṭatvād iti...*, “because it was not obvious...,” and the commentary that follows, e.g.: *yad api rahasyāgameṣu nirūpitam tathā vispaṣṭatvena noktam garbhikṛtya tu nirūpitam...* “This too, which had been explained in the esoteric scriptures (*rahasyāgama*) – [i.e.,] which had not been expounded

providing a scriptural exegesis that would *presuppose* the authority of the commented texts. On the contrary, they only have recourse to the authority of scriptures a posteriori, as a mere confirmation of their rational inquiry. It is by purifying the minds of its readers from the opponents' theses superimposed onto their own experience that the inference constituted by the Pratyabhijñā treatise is supposedly able to transform the content of the Śaiva scriptures into the most concrete, vivid, personal and yet universal experience: the goal of Utpaladeva's rational inquiry is to lead those who engage in its examination to identify themselves with the Lord of the Śaiva *āgama*-s, and therefore to *realize* the full meaning of these scriptures. In other words, although Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta present *āgama* as a means of knowledge superior to reason, they also assign to reason the task of transforming scriptures, understood as a mere "mass of words" (*śabdarāśi*), into a means of knowledge expressing a strong realization (*dṛḍhāvimarśa*), since someone who has gained Recognition through Utpaladeva's inference recognizes by the same token the Śaiva *āgama*-s' validity, i.e., the fact that they express the fullness of a subjectivity that he or she now fully experiences through mere self-awareness: the inferential path of the Pratyabhijñā has the power of making scripture an *āgama* in the full sense of the term.

Of course, reason's power is ultimately limited by the fact that Recognition is in no way *guaranteed* by its use: the most elaborate demonstrations do not necessarily produce the realization of one's identity with Śiva,¹³³ because in a system that defines consciousness as an absolute freedom (*svātantrya*), reason's necessity can only be compelling if consciousness agrees to be compelled, and an individ-

thus in an explicit way, but the explanation of which was contained in embryonic form [in these esoteric scriptures]..."

¹³³ See e.g. ĪPVV III 167: *nanu vyavahārasādhanaśatair apy ātmano mahēśvaratāyām anāśvāsavanto jantavaḥ satatam upalabhyante. satyam ity āha*. "[An objector:] But [we] see that even through innumerable demonstrations [of the validity] of the usage (*vyavahāra*) [of the term 'Lord' with respect to oneself,] some people remain devoid of any faith (*āśvāsa*) in their own identity with the Great Lord! [Utpaladeva] answers: 'this is true...'"

ual can only achieve liberation if the universal consciousness that plays at being deluded in the form of this individual chooses to recover its full self-awareness in him or her, so that ultimately Recognition only depends on the grace (*anugraha*) of the Lord.¹³⁴ However, this grace – which is just as necessary for the *āgama*-s to function as valid means of knowledge – is not to be understood as the arbitrary decision of a distant God, but once again, as an aspect of consciousness' game (*krīḍā*) of self-concealment and self-manifestation: it is the same consciousness that playfully chooses both to delude itself and to recover its full self-awareness, so that Śiva's grace is not ultimately different from its recipient's will.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ See e.g. ĪPVV III 183: *īśvaravaśād eva tu kasyacit prayatnaśatair api pratyabhijñānaṃ notpadyate*. "But it is only due to the Lord that Recognition does not arise in someone despite his innumerable efforts."

¹³⁵ See e.g. TSā 118, where Abhinavagupta, after criticizing the dualistic view of the Śaivasiddhānta regarding grace, adds: *svatantraparamesādvayavāde tūpapadyata etat. yathā hi paramesvaraḥ svarūpācchādanakriḍayā paśuḥ pudgalo'ṇuḥ sampannaḥ, na ca tasya deśakālasvarūpabhedavirodhaḥ, tadvat svarūpasthaganavinivṛttyā svarūpapratyāpattiṃ jhaṭiti vā krameṇa vā samāśrayaṇś chaktipātapātram aṇur ucyate, svātantryamātrasāraś cāsau paramaśivaḥ śakteḥ pātayitā*. "On the other hand, in [our] doctrine of the nonduality with the free (*svatantra*) Highest Lord, [grace] is possible. For just as the Highest Lord becomes the alienated individual (*paśu*), [i.e. what various religious schools call] the person (*pudgala*) or the individual (*aṇu*), and [yet] he is not afflicted by any contradiction due to the differences between the [various] places, times and natures [in which he manifests himself], exactly in the same way, when he chooses to return – either instantly or gradually – to his [real] nature by putting an end to the concealment of his nature, he is said to be an individual who is a fit vessel for the descent of power (*śaktipāta*) [that characterizes grace]; and [yet] he is the Highest Lord, whose essence is nothing but freedom (*svātantrya*) [and] who is the agent of this descent of power." Abhinavagupta insists that thus considering the individual as both the agent and the object of grace solves the problem of grace's apparent arbitrariness (TSā 119): *na ca vācyaṃ kasmāt kasmimścid eva puṃsi śaktipāta iti, sa eva paramesvaras tathā bhātīti satattve ko'sau puṃnāma yaduddeśena viṣayakṛtā codaneyam*. "And one should not ask why the descent of power [occurs] in a particular individual only [and not in all of them, for] it is the Highest Lord himself who is manifest thus [as

Conclusion – Reason as a means of transforming scripture into *āgama*: on apologetics, scriptural authority and philosophy

As we have seen, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta keep emphasizing the supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge and downplaying

this or that particular individual]; therefore, since [the individual] has as his [sole] reality [the Highest Lord], who is this so-called individual with respect to whom this objection is made an issue?" See also Wallis 2008: 275: "Only here in Abhinavagupta's theology does *śaktipāta* appear as a religious experience which the recipient draws to himself, as opposed to something that happens *to* him." Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that this nondualistic notion of grace does not lead to quietism: because grace is nothing but the knowing subject's freedom, intellectual activity should not be despised, nor should liberation be left to the arbitrary will of a God distinct from the knowing subject. See PTV 126–127: *avikalā bhagavadicchā na vicārapadavīm adhiśeta iti ced alaṃ granthadhāraṇavācanavyākhyānavicāraṇādimiti yāyāsenā, parityājya evāyaṃ gurubhāraḥ, tūṣṇīmbhāvaśaraṇair eva stheyam, bhagavadicchaivottāraṇīyam uttārayet, tad icchaivānugrahātmaivaṃ vicāraṇāyaṃ paryavasāyayati, na khalu pādaprasārikayaiva sukhaṃ śayānair bhuñjānais ca svayam avimṛśadbhiḥ svāpekṣatīvratarādiparameśvarānugrahotpannādhikādhikasūkṣmatamavimarśakuśaladhiṣaṇāpariśīlanaparāṇmukhair vā sthātavyam iti*. "If [one objects]: 'The will of the Lord, which is absolute (*avikala*), cannot be subjected to critical examination (*vicāra*), [so] enough of vain efforts such as concentrating on books, discussing, explaining or critically examining [them]! This heavy burden must necessarily be abandoned: [people] should remain silent, only the Lord's will may save [whoever] is to be saved!', [we answer that] it is precisely the [Lord's] will, i.e. grace, which thus makes [us] endeavour critical examination: [people] should certainly not remain at ease while just stretching their legs and enjoying [existence] without realizing [what] they themselves [are] or while avoiding to cultivate a refined intelligence [so as to obtain] the subtlest realization (*vimarśa*) – [a realization] which gets ever more subtle as one receives the grace of the Highest Lord, which [in turn] is more [or less] intense according to oneself (*svāpekṣa*).'" On grace in nondualistic Śaivism see e.g. Bäumer 2007, Wallis 2008 and Furlinger 2009: 79 ff.

in contrast the epistemic validity of reason. In this regard they side with the Brahmanical currents according to which scriptures stand beyond the critical power of reason as their authority is a priori established either through its authoritative (*āpta*) human source or from the fact that they cannot have been made by man (*apauruṣeyatā*). According to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, scriptures are expressions of Śiva's self-realization, whereas reason, which is incapable of attaining truth independently (i.e. without resting on perception and *āgama*), is weak (*durbala*) and therefore unable to put scriptures to the test by evaluating their reliability (*avisamvāditva*), contrary to what Dharmakīrti for instance claims.

However, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, adapting Bhartṛhari's complex understanding of the Veda, distinguish various meanings of the word *āgama* (i.e., *āgama* as an intense realization versus *āgama* as a text claiming to express it, but also *āgama* as the full self-awareness of the absolute consciousness versus *āgama*-s as the more or less complete expressions of it found in the various scriptures, whether Śaiva or not). Thanks to these distinctions, they do not only justify a hierarchized inclusivism that absorbs the authority of all rival scriptures within the Śaiva fold: they also subtly subvert the hierarchical relationship that they themselves proclaim to exist between *āgama* and *yukti*. For if scripture is only the secondary expression of an intense, pre-perceptive and pre-inferential intuition, and if a scripture is only a means of knowledge (i.e., an authentic *āgama*) for someone who has faith in it (*tadāśvasta*) insofar as he or she realizes – or at least assumes – that this scripture expresses such an intense intuition, its authority cannot be presupposed when addressing those who do not have faith in it. Reason, on the other hand, can lead to the realization that the Śaiva scriptures express because this realization is contained within any conscious being's self-awareness and because reason has the ability to eliminate the theses that alienate the individuals from this self-awareness. In this regard, the power of rational inquiry does not only end up being (at least implicitly) equated with that of *āgama*-s,¹³⁶ in contrast with the

¹³⁶ Thus according to Lawrence 2003, §29, "as engendering a 'purification of conceptualization' (*vikalpasaṃskāra*) which leads the student to

Advaitavedāntins' attitude towards reason for instance;¹³⁷ it is also presented as capable of making obvious what is present but "hidden" (*saṃnigūḍha*) in the Śaiva scriptures and of thus transforming into an authentic *āgama* the mere "mass of words" in which they consist for those who do not have faith in them. Utpaladeva can therefore present his rational path as progressing independently of scriptural authority, but also as capable of *making the Śaiva scriptures authori-*

realize identity with Śiva, rigorously philosophical discourse becomes in essence identical with *āgama*."

¹³⁷ The Pratyabhijñā's position sometimes appears very close to that of the Vedāntins (it is the case for example regarding the idea that reasoning is by itself groundless: see above, fn. 69; or regarding the statement in ĪPK 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 113, that *pramāṇa*-s are unable to function with respect to the absolute: cf. e.g. Halbfass 1983: 45). However, according to Śaṅkara, Sureśvara or Padmapāda, reasoning is only a kind of propaedeutics that helps prepare to the understanding of the Great Sayings (*mahāvākya*), but "it does not anticipate that insight which can only result from the 'hearing' of the Upaniṣadic statements" (Halbfass 1983: 58). Thus according to Sureśvara, the method of *anvayavyatireka* enables to separate the Self from what is not the Self, and this method is part of the qualification (*adhikāra*) for understanding scriptures, but it cannot by itself bring about the liberating knowledge which only comes from the Veda (ibid.: 65: "In a sense, reasoning in terms of *anvayavyatireka* produces only an openness which has to be filled, or perhaps even a confusion which has to be eliminated, by the Vedic revelation. To him who has freed himself from false superimpositions by reasoning in this way, [...] who asks in bewilderment (*vīkṣāpanna*) 'who am I?' (*ko'smi*), who may even think that he himself has been discarded (*tyakto'ham*) in this process – to him the Veda speaks in a meaningful and soteriologically effective manner when it says: *tat tvam asi*." See also ibid.: 66–67, and 69: "revelation, the Veda, is the indispensable source of liberating knowledge; it is the condition of its possibility.") If Utpaladeva also considers that reason merely has the power to eliminate wrong notions superimposed onto the Self, nonetheless, by way of contrast he presents this power as capable of making someone fit for understanding the Śaivāgamas precisely because it is capable of bringing about the very realization (*vimarśa*) of which the Śaiva scriptures are an expression, and he asserts that even someone who does not acknowledge these scriptures can be led to this realization through the treatise's rational inquiry.

tative: if *āgama* is said to be the strongest means of knowledge, only reason can make it available to those who do not have faith in it beforehand.

It is thus an apologetic concern (the very concern that makes Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta assert the supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge and that of Śaiva *āgama*-s within the various scriptures) that leads the author of the ĪPK to invent a path which departs from mere scriptural exegesis and progresses with the sole help of reason and experience: while Dharmakīrti subjects scriptures to the critical examination of reason, Utpaladeva claims that such an endeavour is impossible but acknowledges that the authority of scriptures must be set aside when addressing those who do not recognize it, and subjects experience to the critical examination of reason so as to reveal the Śaiva scriptures' authority instead of presupposing it.

Admittedly, the Śaiva *āgama*-s remain present in the Pratyabhijñā system not only as its horizon (since rational inquiry ultimately leads to a truth already contained in them) but also as its point of departure and its very foundation, since perception itself is said to be grounded in *āgama* and since any individual's self-awareness, however limited and inadequate, is considered an aspect of *āgama* conceived as the universal consciousness' realization of itself. However, the distinction between the primary sense of the term *āgama* (as *vimarśa*) and its secondary sense (as scripture) enables Utpaladeva to absorb as it were the religious understanding of *āgama* into the much more neutral notion of *vimarśa*: to say that perception requires *āgama* does not amount to saying that immediate experience would require scriptural authority in order to be valid, but only that any conscious manifestation (*prakāśa*) contains at its core a realization (*vimarśa*) in which consciousness actively becomes aware of itself by grasping itself as being such and such.¹³⁸ Thus *āgama* can

¹³⁸ While distinguishing the various means of knowledge, Abhinavagupta equates direct perception with manifestation (*prakāśa*) and *āgama* with realization (*vimarśa*) (see above, fn. 41), and this distinction should be understood in connection with chapter 1.5 of the ĪPK (devoted to the examination of perception) where *vimarśa*, defined as the power

be said to be “as it were the very life of perception and inference” insofar as *āgama* and *vimarśa* are equated, and the word *āgama* ends up being partly stripped of its religious meaning and clothed into a sect-neutral epistemological discourse: it can be understood as being nothing more than the dynamic awareness at the heart of any experience (and yet Utpaladeva can claim that the Śaiva scriptures express this dynamic awareness).

Modern scholars have often wondered whether and in what sense Indian thought qualifies as philosophy. Many indologists now consider this question superfluous (or at least too awkwardly formulated to be worth pondering over) among other reasons because it is most often formulated as an exclusive alternative (Indian thought has to be either religious or philosophical) resting on the assumption that Western philosophy is in essence distinct from and independent of religious matters. Obviously though, the history of Western philosophy is fundamentally intertwined with that of Western religions, and the relationship between reason and scriptural authority in particular has constituted one of the major points of tension – and therefore one of the major motors of creativity – within Western philosophy. Similarly, Buddhist epistemology for instance has often been seen as a purely theoretical effort disconnected from any religious concern,¹³⁹ and recent studies have shown that in fact it comes within the scope of a properly Buddhist strategy and strongly relates to the religious tradition on the background of which it builds a philosophical discourse while making a reflective effort to define its relationship with scriptures.¹⁴⁰ The study of the Pratyabhijñā sys-

of consciousness to apprehend itself, is described as the very essence of perceptual manifestation (*prakāśa*). On *vimarśa* as the essence of *prakāśa*, see e.g. Alper 1987, Ratié 2007: 337 (fn. 51) and 339–340, and Ratié 2011a: 162–167 and 495–543.

¹³⁹ See e.g. Stcherbatsky 1930: 2: “In the intention of its promoters the system [of Buddhist logic] had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation.”

¹⁴⁰ See e.g. Krasser 2004, Eltschinger 2007, Franco 2007, Eltschinger 2010 and 2011.

tem seems to suffer from the opposite short-range perspective: so far, with the notable exception of Raffaele Torella's works, it has mostly been presented as a purely religious exegetical attempt to interpret scriptural texts.¹⁴¹ Utpaladeva's path is surely the product of Śaiva apologetics, but far from being a theology exclusively preoccupied of understanding its own scriptures, it endeavours to defend them by setting aside their authority, precisely because it cannot afford to presuppose an authority that it must reveal. This strategy requires the elaboration of an original and complex definition of *āgama* that both justifies the authority and supremacy of the Śaiva scriptures *and* grants reason the power to seek and find truth autonomously: it is by defending the Śaiva scriptures that Utpaladeva ends up leaving the plane of theology to become a philosopher.

¹⁴¹ See e.g. Alper 1987: 178, n. 1, where the author insists that Utpaladeva's thought is not "philosophy" but "theology" (on the view that the Pratyabhijñā treatise is purely theological, see Ratié 2011a: 13, fn. 26).

Abbreviations and references

General abbreviations

ATBS	Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien
conj.	conjecture
p.n.p.	passage not preserved in
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
VÖAW	Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens

Manuscripts

- B – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Baroda, Central Library, no. 1828 [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]
- BL – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī*, London, British Library, Oriental Manuscripts no. 6760 A [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]
- J – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Jammu, Sri Ranbir Institute, Raghunath mandir, no.19 [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]
- L – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Lucknow, Akhila Bhāratīya Saṃskṛta Pariṣad, no. 3366 [*“Pratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinī laghvī,”* [Saptarṣi]saṃvat [49]42, Vikramasaṃvat 1823 (=1766 AD), paper, *śāradā* script]
- P – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute (BORI), no. 466 of 1875–76 [*“Īśvarapratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinī,”* birch-bark, *śāradā* script]
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- S2 – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 1035 = DSO 00001 8219 [Vikramādityasaṃ. 1830 (=1773 AD); paper, *śāradā* script]
- SOAS] *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, London, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library, no. 207 in R.C Dogra’s 1978 catalogue / MS no. 44255 [*“Pratyabhijñāsūtra with Abhinavagupta’s Sūtrārthavimarśinī,”* paper, *śāradā* script]

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BSū – *Brahmasūtra*, *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, with the commentaries *Bhāmatī*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimala*, edited by K. L. Joshi, 2 vol., Parimal Publications, Parimal Sanskrit Series 1, Delhi, third edition, 1996

ĪPK – *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*: see Torella 2002

ĪPV – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, edited with notes by M.R. Śāstrī/M.K. Śāstrī, KSTS 22 & 33, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 2 vol., Srinagar, 1918–1921

ĪPVV – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī* by *Abhinavagupta*, edited by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 60, 62 & 65, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 3 vol., Bombay, 1938–1943

ĪS = *Īśvarasiddhi*, in – *Siddhitrayī* and *Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-vṛtti* of *Rajaka Utpala Deva*, edited with notes by Pandit M. K. Shastri, KSTS 34, Srinagar, 1921

MVT – *Mālinivijayottara Tantram*, edited by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 37, Bombay, 1922

NBh = *Nyāyabhāṣya* – see NSū

NBhūṣ – *Śrīmadācāryabhāsarvajñapraṇītasya nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam nyāyabhūṣaṇam*, edited by Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, Śaḍdarśana-prakāśagranthamālā, Varanasi, 1968

NBT = *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* – *Dharmottarapradīpa* (being a sub-commentary on *Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, a commentary on *Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*), edited by D. Malvania, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955

NM – *Nyāyamañjarī* of *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, with *Ṭippaṇī* – *Nyāyasaurabha* by the editor, edited by K. S. Varadacharya, 2 vol., Oriental Research Institute Series 116 & 139, Mysore, 1969–1983

NSū = *Nyāyasūtra* – *Gautamīanyāyadarśana* with *Bhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana*, *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, vol. I, edited by A. Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1997

PTV = *Parātrīśikāvivarāṇa* – *Parātrimshikā* with commentary, the latter by *Abhinavagupta*, edited with notes by Paṇḍit M. R. Shāstrī, KSTS 18, Bombay, 1918

PV – *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan), edited by Y. Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971–1972, pp. 1–206

- PVin – *Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2*, Critically edited by E. Steinkellner, China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, Beijing-Vienna, 2007
- PVSV = *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti – The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, text and critical notes by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma, 1960
- ŚD – *Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Śrīsomānandanātha with the Vṛtti by Utpaladeva*, edited by M. K. Shastri, KSTS 54, Srinagar, 1934
- ŚV – *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimīśra*, edited by G. S. Rāy, Ratnā Publications, Vārāṇasī, 1993
- TĀ – *Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with commentary by Rājānaka Jayaratha*, edited with notes by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 47, 52, 57, 58 & 59, 12 vol., Allahabad Srinagar Bombay, 1918–1938
- TĀV = *Tantrālokaviveka* – see TĀ
- TS – *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary "Pañjikā" of Shri Kamalshīla*, edited by D. Shastri, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati Series 1, Varanasi, 1968
- TSā – *The Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta*, edited with notes by M. R. Shāstrī, KSTS 17, Bombay, 1918
- VP 1 = *Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa 1 – Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva, Kāṇḍa 1*, edited by K. A. S. Iyer, Deccan College Monograph Series 32, Poona, 1966
- VPV = *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* – see VP I
- VSū – *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the commentary of Candrānanda*, critically edited by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Gaekwad Oriental Series 136, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961

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